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PREFACE
This appeal is taken in only one of the three cases
which were consolidated for trial, No. 224,441, Lignell and
Todd v. Berg Construction Co. and Fidelity and Deposit.

In

this brief the parties are identified as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are E. Keith Lignell and Burton M.

Todd and their wives, and are sometimes called "Lignell and
Todd," or the "owners."
2.

Defendants are Clifford M. Berg and William R.

Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company,
and Frank C. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a
Berg Construction Company (sometimes called "contractor" or
the "joint venture"), and Fidelity and Deposit Company of
Maryland (sometimes called the "bonding company" or "surety").
Reference is sometimes made to Clifford M. Berg and to Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg
Brothers Construction Company which is referred to as "Berg
Brothers" or the "partnership."

Though neither the individual

nor the partnership is a defendant, as such, their positions
as joint venturers require frequent reference to them.
Parties to the cases consolidated with the instant
case are:
1.

Hendrik Copinga and Brent Greenwood, d/b/a Western

Drywall, a partnership (sometimes called "drywaller" or
"Western").
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2.

Claron Bailey, called "Bailey."

3.

Comstock Electric of Utah, Inc., called

"Comstock."

4.

Murray Electrical Services, Inc., called

"Murray."
The reporter's transcript is referred to herein
as "T.

"

The Clerk's records have been designated

by him as "A," "B," "C" and "D" and are referred to as
"R. A

" or R. c __ ," etc., in this brief.
Unless otherwise indicated all statutory reference:

are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H.
LIGNELL, his wife, BURTON M.
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

v.

Case No. 15001

CLIFFORD M. BERG and WILLIAM
R. BERG, a partnership, d/b/a
BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, and FRANK C. BERG,
an individual, a joint
venture, d/b/a BERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and FIDELITY
AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND,
a corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
On October 9, 1973, the drywall subcontractor,
Western Drywall, commenced suit in the Third Judicial District Court, No. 214954, against Berg Brothers Construction
for breach of its subcontract agreement and against Fidelity
and Deposit Company of Maryland on the labor and material
bond provided by it relating to the Incline Terrace Apartments, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The drywallers also sought to

foreclose a mechanics lien on the premises and, in addition
thereto, claimed a direct cause of action against the owners,
Lignell and Todd.

A materialman, Claron Bailey, later joined
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.,
that suit as a third-party Plaintiff and alleged a mechanic
lien against the property, a direct cause of action against
the surety, a direct cause of action against Lignell
ally and against both Lignell and Todd.

per~

On September 23,

1974, Murray Electric commenced suit against Berg Brothers
Construction Company, No. 222531, alleging $21,360.00 due'
~~

breach of contract, and against the surety on the labor
material bond (R. 02-6).

In August of 1975 that complaint

amended to include some seven causes of action directly ag<
Lignell and Todd.

In addition, the amended complaint addec

Comstock as a party Plaintiff, alleged several alternate
~e

theories of recovery against the surety and recognized

JOint venture, Berg Construction Company, as the proper De·
fendant

(R. C276-302).

That complaint was amended a seconi

time on April 20, 1976 (R. C593-610).
In December of 1974 Lignell and Todd brought suit,
224,441, against the joint venture for a refund or return
monies which Lignell and Todd claimed had been paid in exc'
any sums due under the construction contract, and against·
bonding company as the obligee on its performance bond.
January of 1975 all cases were consolidated for trial
motion of the partnership (R. C252-254).

u~n

Thereafter, Clif

M. Berg and William R. Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construct
Company, filed a counterclaim to the action of Lignell ~d
Todd.

-2-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was had on the issues commencing on August
14, 1976, and concluding on October 1, 1976.

All claims of

the drywallers, the materialmen and the electricians directly against Lignell and Todd were either dismissed or
disposed of by a verdict of no cause of action.

The dry-

wallers and materialmen obtained a judgment against the
partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, and the
bonding company in the sum of $42,653.68.

Murray Electric

received a judgment against the partnership and the bonding
company in the sum of $61,693.01.

Clifford Berg and William

Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company (the partnership) obtained a judgment over against Lignell and Todd
for the sums awarded to the electrician and the drywaller
plus an additional $54,801.99 for a total judgment of
$159,148.68.
On November 30, 1976, the trial court allowed the
imposition of interest on the judgment against Lignell and
Todd in the sum of $25,535.55 and, in addition thereto,
awarded attorney's fees on behalf of the partnership and
the bonding company against Lignell and Todd in the sum of
$21,000.00 each, and passed through to Lignell and Todd
the attorney's fees that were awarded to the subcontractors
in the sums of $11,000.00 and $21,000.00 respectively, for
a total award of attorney's fees amounting to $74,000.00
(R. Cl395-1397, 1409-1417).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT

mJ APPEAL

The Plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse the

jud~,

of the trial court or in the alternative to grant Plaintiff
a trial in their case only.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February of 1971 E. Keith Lignell and Burton
M.

Todd began investigating the possibility of constructir.

an apartment complex on the corner of 4th South and lOth
East in Salt Lake City, Utah.

As originally envisioned,

the complex would contain 125 units located in three build·
ings (designated "A," "B," and "C").

In February of that

year they commenced discussions with Clifford M. Berg
regarding the construction of the complex (T. 1231).
Lignell and Todd had dealt with Berg previously on the
construction of another apartment house in the area. They
also, at that time, commenced negotiations with several
lending institutions to finance the construction of the
project.

Lignell and Todd further proceeded to have

pl~s

and specifications for the project prepared by an architec:
Ronald Molen.

Preliminary plans were generated and sub-

mitted to the lending institution for its approval.

By

September 15, 1971, a detailed set of plans and specifica·
tions was completed and given to Berg.

Mr.

Berg thereafte:

transmitted the plans to the Salt Lake City Building
Department to obtain a building permit.

The plans were

reviewed by Mr. Virgil Dick who indicated on the plans in
red marking that they were deficient in certain areas (T.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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976-980).

On or about October 20, 1971, Berg met with

representatives of the Salt Lake City Building Department,
including Mr. Dick, discussed the plans with them and
received back one set of plans with the notations and
markings of the Department on them (T. 1009, 1018, 2675).
Mr. Berg obtained a footing and foundation permit for the
project from the City on October 22, 1971.
Prior to the time the contract was signed Berg
had presented to Lignell and Todd a detailed itemization
of the bid (T. 1238, 2677, Ex's. 127, 139).

After dis-

cussing the required changes with the City, he reviewed
the figures several times and determined that no change
would be made in the bid (T. 1019, 2678).

Thereafter, on

November 16, 1971, Clifford Berg entered into a contract
with Lignell and Todd for the construction of the Incline
Terrace Apartment project.

The completion date for the

entire project was November 16, 1972, but Berg agreed to
construct the buildings sequentially so that Lignell and
Todd could commence renting them.

The C building was to

be completed first, then B, then A (T. 1172-1173, 1263-1264).
The agreed price for constructing the project was
$1,455,000.00; excluded from the contract were certain
items, including the demolition, carpets, drapes, landscaping, excavation in excess of $30,000.00, swimming pool
and patio which Lignell and Todd agreed to have done
themselves.

The parties also agreed that the funds would

be disbursed by Lignell upon the receipt of a draw request
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from Clifford Berg (T. 1179-1181, 1206, 1250-1251).
During the same time that Berg was negotiating
with the owners, he was also attempting to procure the
necessary bonding capacity from Fidelity and Deposit company of Maryland.

Berg, by himself, was not able to

obtain a bond of the size required, therefore, he approached his older brother, Frank, and promised him $7,500,
from the profits on the job if he would go in with him on
the bond (T. 1067).

Frank Berg agreed to do this.

Willi~

Berg and Clifford Berg had signed a bond application relating to the project on July 27, 1971 (Ex. 256).

Frank

Berg signed an application for the bond on November 24,
1971, whereon the applicant was identified as Berg Construe

tion Company, the joint venture (Ex. 255).

Mr. Berg did not start the actual work on the
project until some time in February, 1972 (T. 664).

At

about that time the original contract was changed, on the
insistence of the bonding company, to include as parties
not only Lignell and Todd but also their wives, who were
also owners of the property.

In addition, the contracting

entity was changed from Clifford M. Berg to "Clifford M.
Berg and William R. Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction
Company, and Frank c. Berg, an individual, a joint venture
d/b/a Berg Construction Company"

(T. 2146-2147, Ex. 9) •

Various subcontracts relating to the project were also
changed to reflect the fact that the joint venture was
party constructing the project (Ex. 20).

Clifford Berg
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we

was in charge of the project for the joint venture and was
authorized to bind the joint venture, all participants
thereon and all rnembersthereof (Ex. 164).

Lignell was

authorized to act on behalf of the four owners and virtually all of the problems in the process of construction
were handled by Berg and Lignell in their representative
capacities.
One of the original bidders, the electrician,
could not meet the requirements for participating in a
bonded project.

Thereafter, Mr. Berg contacted Mr. Wilford

Comstock of Comstock Electric and asked him to participate
in the project in his place.
for $171,000.00.

Comstock's original bid was

Berg, however, had only allowed $117,000.00

for the electrician in the bid to the

owners~

that bid was rejected as being too high.

therefore,

Thereafter, Berg

and Comstock negotiated the price of the electrical bid
down to $107,000.00 which was accepted (T. 311-312).
Construction was disorganized and proceeded slowly
(T. 1271, 2185).

The contractor was unsure of its ability

to construct a project of that size (T. 1268-1270).

It

had no bookkeeper for the project and no superintendent
(T. 2235).

until later in 1973 no telephone was installed

on the project which required Berg to travel several blocks
to the Arctic Circle to phone the subcontractors and supplier> (T. 1871).

Later on, Berg asked Mrs. Schoppe, the

apartment manager, to contact the subcontractors for him
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(T. 2185, 2210).

There was no scheduling of the

subcontr~

tors and a great deal of confusion on the job (T. 1870,
2184-2185).

Subcontractors and others complained about

the quality of the work but nothing was done (T. 163,
1876-1879, 2191-2192, 2210).
In September of 1972 Lignell and Todd decided to
add an extra floor to the B and A buildings and increase
the number of units from 125 to 147.

This was to be ac-

complished by adding 10 units on the new floor in the
B building, 8 units on one new floor in the A building

~d

adding four units in other portions of the buildings, one
in C, two in B and one in A (T. 1253) •

Lignell and Berg

engaged in negotiations concerning this modification of
the plans.

At Lignell's request Berg provided several

documents setting forth

th~

price of the added units

units and the amount of extras to the contract (Ex's. 105,
128, 129).

In April of 1973 Lignell and Berg

executed~

Addendum to the contract with the joint venture covering
the additional 22 units, plus extras and extending the
completion date to July 15, 1973 (T. 1272, Ex. 11).

All

parties agreed that after that document was executed, the
contract price amounted to $1,759,003.00.
Mr. Berg commenced to make construction draws in
April of 1972; Lignell and Todd prepared checks for the
subcontractors and materialmen based thereon.

Berg

continued to make draw requests until October of that
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year.

During the months of October, November, December of

1972 and January of 1973 Berg made no draws.

In the fall of 1972 the project was refinanced to
include the addition of the extra floors and the expansion
of the number of units in the complex.

The new construction

financing was to terminate on November 1, 1973 (T. 1283).
In addition, Lignell and Todd sold the ground upon which
the project was being built for some $250,000.00 and then
leased it back with a limited option to purchase.
Mr. Berg recommenced making construction draws in
February of 1973 and continued to do so Qntil the fall of
that year.

At trial Mr. Berg contended that payments had

not been timely made by Lignell; however, Berg's expert,
Mr. Mark Hatch, acknowledged that the payments by Lignell
were made, in the most part, prcw-.ptly upon receipt of the
required draw requests.l (T. 3158-3172).
1972 was a time of high building activity in the

valley.

The original sheetrocker, Harry Nichols, did not

maintain an adequate crew on the job.

In September or

October of that year Lignell insisted that Berg fire him.
At the time that Mr. Nichols was dismissed he had completed
the drywalling on just 32 units, although the completion
date for the entire project was only two months away (T.
lsome of the subcontractors also claimed that
they were not paid timely, howeve:, a revie~ of the draw
requests by Berg to Lignell relat1ng to the1r accounts
again revealed that, in the most part, all sums requested
by Berg were paid promptly within a few days (T. 19901993, 2870-2878).
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2756-2747; Ex. 226).

Thereafter, Lignell contacted an

acquaintance of his, Hendrik Copinga, and requested that
he come up to the project and discuss the drywall matter
with Mr. Berg.

Mr. Copinga did this and ultimately he

and his partner, Brent Greenwood, d/b/a Western Drywall,
became engaged in the remainder of the drywall application
on the Incline Terrace Apartments.
In January of 197 3 Comstock Electric was experienc:
financial difficulties; therefore, it left the project

~d

was replaced by Murray Electrical Services, Inc., a nonunion electrical contractor owned by Mrs. Joyce Comstock,
the wife of Wilford Comstock.

Mr. Comstock served as the

master electrician for both Comstock and Murray.
The work did not proceed in an orderly fashion
from the start and Lignell, or his representative, found
that it was necessary for them to assume a more active
role in the construction of the project in an effort to
get it completed on time.

By July of 1973, the date the

entire project was to be completed, there remained much to
be done.

Lignell was concerned that the project would not

be completed before the long-term loan commitment expired.
In addition, it had been anticipated by Lignell and Todd
that the project would be completed far enough in advance
of the expiration of the permanent financing takeout that
the project could achieve a substantial occupancy rate
which was required by the permanent lender

(T. 3301-3302).
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In the fall of 1973 Berg became involved with
several other projects and was frequently absent from the
Incline Terrace, thus delaying the completion of the project and increasing the possibility that the owner's permanent
financing would be lost (T. 1870-1871).

Lignell made written

demands upon the contractor informing it that it was in
default under the terms of the contract and demanding
that the project be completed immediately (Ex's. 87, 88).
At the same time, Lignell was working with the insurance
company to receive an extension of the final takeout commitment date, which he was ultimately able to do.
In October of 1973 Lignell demanded that Berg
terminate the electrician, Murray Electrical Services,
Inc., because it was not diligently prosecuting the work
and was delaying the completion of the buildings.

Mr.

Berg, who was aware that the owners' financing was in jeopardy, was also concerned about the progress the electrician
was making (T. 688, 690).

Berg terminated Murray and

thereafter contacted Mr. Lynn Bateman of Bateman Electric
and requested that he come up and complete the job.

In the

early part of October, 1973, Bateman and Berg met
on the job and reviewed the work that had to be done.
Mr. Berg stated that what was left to be done was "pretty

obvious." (T. 2452) .

Thereafter, Bateman commenced to

complete the electrical work on the project, for which he
was paid directly by Lignell.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology -11Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

--Lignell, anticipating the closing of the project,
requested from Berg a final list of all the extras that
were claimed for the project.

On November 1, 1973, Berg

submitted a list to Lignell which Lignell assumed was the
final list of extras (Ex. 130).

In January of 1974, Lig-

nell, Todd and Clifford Berg met at Berg's house to resolv'
some of the conflicts relating to additional costs and ex·
penses on the project and agreed, they thought, to certau
set-offs relating to work that had not been done.
In February of 1974, some seven months late, the
project was finally ready to close.

To this end, Title

Insurance Agency, which was representing the permanent
lender on the project, obtained from the contractor a list
of the final pay-off amounts and holdbacks remaining on tli·
project.

In addition, a statement was signed by Clifford

Berg, William Berg and Frank Berg reciting the existence
of the joint venture and releasing any claims it had again.
the premises (Ex's. 164, 165).

Lignell and Todd, although

claiming that they had overpaid on the construction contra
provided Title Insurance Agency with the necessary fundst
pay the remaining debts on the project.

In reliance upon

the documents executed by the brothers Berg, Title Insur·
ance Agency disbursed the funds to all the subcontractors,
the exception of the drywaller, and closed the project.
Mr.

Ellertson, president of Title Insurance Agency, testi·

fied that but for the work of Lignell and Todd and their
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providing the funds necessary to clear off the liens or
claims which could become liens on the premises, the project could not have been closed (T. 1676).
Evidence adduced at the trial, but not permitted to
go to the jury, indicated that the joint venture was never
licensed as a contractor by the State of Utah and that the
partnership, although previously licensed, had not been licensed from April, 1971, to July, 1974.

The partnership

obtained a new license in July, 1974, which was revoked
by the State in December, 1974 (T. 3038-3048, R. C993).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY VERDICT IN THE CASE OF LIGNELL AND TODD
VERSUS BERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE.
The partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, recovered a judgment against Lignell and Todd in the
amount of $159,148.68 (R. Cl391).

This sum was apparently

composed of $42r653.68 which was awarded to the drywallers
against the partnership (R. Cl390), $61,693.01 which was
awarded to the electrician (Murray) against the partnership (R. Cl391), both of which were then passed through
to Lignell and Todd, and in addition

thereto~

$54,801.99

was added for extras claimed by the partnership in its own
behalf (Ex. 252).
Both the partnership and the Surety agreed throughout the trial that they were indebted to the subcontractors
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in the amount of their claims (T. 252).

In fact, they

actually assisted the subcontractors in presenting their
cases and in obtaining their judgments.

Plaintiffs are

not contesting in this appeal the judgments rendered agair
surety and the partnership in favor of the subcontractors,
although there were numerous defenses to those claims that
surety and the partnership either waived or chose not to
assert.

It does not follow, however, that a judgment

against the surety and the partnership resulting from
the waiver of defenses and the failure to distinguish arnon
the parties should, or can, be passed through and become
a judgment against the owners as was done in this case.
A.

Neither the contract standards nor the parties

involved in the subcontracts. were the same as those be tweet
the owners and the contractor.

As far as the joint _ventur

was concerned the standard of workmanship required was set
forth in the Construction Contract (Ex. 9).

Therein it is

stated, in ,Ill. 4:
"The Contractor warrants to the Owner and
the Architect that all materials and equipment
incorporated in the work will be new unless
otherwise specified, and that all work will
be of good quality, free f~om faults and defects and in conformance w~th the Contract
DOCUments. All work not so conforming to
these standards may be considered defective."
(emphasis added)
The subcontracts with the drywallers and the electrician,
however, contained no standards or warranties concerning
the quality of the work to be performed (Ex's. 15, 57).
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As a result, work which might be permissible under the
subcontracts would not necessarily meet the standards of
the construction contract.

Plaintiffs submit that such

was the case in this suit.
B.

Much of the work performed was defective.

The testimony was uncontroverted that after the drywall
had been painted there were numerous streaks and shadows
on the joints (T. 1325, 1846, 1873, 1878, 1899, 1922).
Some of the witnesses indicated that this was the fault
of the drywaller because of improper sanding (T. 1843-1845,
1872, 1879, 2321).

The drywaller contended, however,

that it was relieved of any responsibility because the
walls had been painted.

No one disputed that the streaks

and shadows existed or that the owners had spent in excess
of $28,000.00 to correct the problem (Ex's. 153, 154).
Similarly, there was uncontroverted testimony that
some of the halls were wavy and "looked like a snake."
(T. 1843, 2211).

The drywaller accused the carpenter and

the carpenter claimed that he was relieved of responsibility
because the drywaller had nailed its wallboard on the studs.
Again, there was no dispute that the defective work existed,
the dispute revolved around which subcontractor was responsible.

In this regard it mattered not to the owners

which subcontractor was at fault, since they had no
privity with any of them.

The owners, under their contract,

looked exclusively to the general contractor to deliver
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a building free of defects.

This it failed to do.

The

owners had no responsibility to show which of the subcontractors was at fault, this was the burden of the general
contractor if it chose to contest the subcontractors'
claims.
Here, the subcontractors' claims were not
contested by the contractor, but that can in no way shift
the burden of proof concerning the cause of the defects
to the owners.

All the owners were required to do was to

show that the building was tendered to them in defective
condition under the terms of the construction contract.
This they did.

Thus, although a subcontractor might

ha~

convinced the jury that the defects were either not its
fault or that i t had been relieved of the responsibility
therefor, such a showing would not relieve the general
contractor from the ultimate responsibility for the defeet.
There is absolutely no dispute that one of the uni:
508-A, contained a noxious, vomitous odor which commenced
in the spring of 197 3, when it was sprayed with wall spray
by the drywaller (T. 1334, 1908-1909, 2203).

The testi-

money was uncontroverted that the smell persisted, in spH
of numerous attempts to alleviate it, until the apartment
was completely gutted, the wall board, tile, drapes and
carpets, cabinets and doors were replaced and the apartmen
repainted (T. 1440-1442, 1493, 2203-2205).

Although Mr·
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Copinga, the very person who applied the spray, admitted
that when he last checked the apartment in the spring of
1976 it still smelled; he, nonetheless, disclaimed any
responsibility for it (T. 2329).

No one contended that

the smell was the owners' fault.

Plaintiffs clearly showed

that the apartment smelled when the building was delivered
to fuem and that as a result the apartment was uninhabitable
and that they were required to forego two years of rental
income and expended $3,700.00 to correct the defect (T. 14411447, Ex. 207).

The contractor presented no evidence refuting

Plaintiffs' claim that the building was defective.
With respect to the drywall, Berg acknowledged
that the construction contract required good work, but
admitted that the job, in his estimation, was "average"
(T. 161, 2790).

Mr. Jay Memmott testified that the work

was not of good quality and characterized it as being
"poor to mediocre"

(T. 1853).

Further testimony indicated

that the wall spray texture was inconsistent, which in
some apartments resulted in big "globs" on the walls (T.
1324-1325, 1842, 1851, 1880).

There were gaps in the sheetrock

(T. 1893, 1969), doorbells covered by sheetrock (T. 935-90),
holes for electrical outlets cut too large (T. 1877) and
round holes cut for square doorbells all of which had to
be repaired at the owners' expense (T. 1899).
wiring that did not meet the code was installed
by the electricians (T. 935.72-935.73, 935.91-935.92).
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This had to be replaced at the expense of Lignell and Todc
(T. 1814).

Many of the electrical connections did not war

appliances were not hooked up and switches were installed
seven feet off the ground (T. 2185, 2206-2207, 2209, 2396·
2397, 2421).

The owners were required to pay more than

$40,000.00 to complete the electrical work and correct the

defects, and bring the building up to an acceptable stand~
(Ex ' s • 15 3 , 15 4 ) •

Although Berg did not contest the electricians'
charge for their work, it is clear that that work did not
meet the contract standard of "good" quality for purposes
of determining amounts due between the owners and the
general contractor.

In addition, doors swung the wrong

way (T. 1895) and light fixtures were hung so that they
were broken off by opening doors

(T. 1894, 1969).

Gobs of

glue were left by the cabinet subcontractor (T. 1884-1886,
2217)

and numerous areas of the project

(T. 1883, 1886).

ha~

to be repainte

These defects were all paid for by the

owners.

c.

The project was delivered late to the owners.

Mr. Berg testified that the arrangement with the owners
was that the project would be built sequentially starting

in reverse alphabetical order with the
(T. 1172-1173).

C building first

The original completion date for the en·

tire project was November 16, 1972

(1173).

When the

additional floors were added to the B and A buildings,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
-18-errors.

the completion date for the project was extended to
July 15, 1973.

Although the changes to the

c

building

were very modest, it was not completed until January,
1973, and the entire project was not closed until February
of 197 4.
It was important to the owners that the project
be completed promptly so as not to jeopardize the longterm financing.

Further, the owners anticipated achieving

a substantial rental volume prior to the time the longterm loan was to be closed (T. 766, 767, 2285-2286).
was well-known by Berg (T. 690).

This

Due to the delay in

completion not only were the rentals lost, but $200,000.00
was withheld by the permanent lender until the required
rental level was achieved (T. 3301-3302).
D.

The charges for electrical extras were dupli-__ _

cative, did not distinguish between the owners' and the
contractor's responsibility and often related to defective
or LU1completed work.

The evidence on the electrical por-

tion of the case clearly showed that many of the electricians' change orders were duplicated, often several times
over (T. 337, 345, 351, 361, 364, 366, 371, 381-A, 384,
388, 409, 419, 420, 422, 424, 486, 488, 490, 493, 495497, 500).

The duplicate tickets, however, usually contained

different prices for the same item or contained no price
at all

(T. 493-495).

Mr. Comstock readily admitted the

duplications but was often unable to identify the ticket
for which he was seeking compensation or state how much he
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was charging (T. 498).

Several times, in response to

inquiries from his counsel concerning his charges, he
responded that he "didn't know," "would only be guessing,"
"didn't know what was done" or that he "didn't handle the
books"

(T. 363, 368-369, 377, 380, 386, 488, 492, 498-

499, 528, 551, 570, 935-112, 935-24).

Although Mr. Corn-

stock acknowledged that there were some credits due for
work not done, he did not know how much (T. 369-371).
In addition to the voluminous work tickets generated by the electricians (Ex's. 21, 22, 26, 58), Mr.
Comstock on December 18, 1972, sent a letter to Berg
telling him that all prior change orders were void and
that new change orders would be issued (Ex. 35).

At

trial, however, Comstock sought compensation for these
"void" change orders as well as the new ones issued in
their place.

Because of the voluminous and duplicative

change orders and Comstock's letter voiding them out
Lignell requested a clarification of the electrician's
billings (T. 770-771, 820).

On or about March 1, 1973,

Lignell and Berg met with the Comstocks to determine the
exact status of the electrical charges.

At that meeting,

the Comstocks presented a list of all the claimed change
order (Ex. 100), which list Lignell reviewed; he approved
some and rejected some.

It was his understanding that

there were no other change orders relating to the electrical work on the project at that time

(T. 768-779).
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In January, 1973, Comstock left the project because
of financial difficulties and was replaced on March 1,
1973, by Murray.

Although there was a dispute concerning

how much electrical work remained to be done, in March and
again in April Comstock sent a bill to Berg stating that
the total amount due to it for work on the Incline project
amounted to $7,412.04 (Ex's. 51, 52).
Mr. Comstock, the architect's representative, Mr.
Huss, and the Comstock foreman all testified that when
Comstock left the job in January, 1973, some two months
after the entire project was originally to have been completed, there had been no electrical work done in the A
building (T. 530, 884, 910).

At the trial, however,

Comstock presented numerous change orders relating directly
to the A building or the additional 22 units, part of
which were located in that building (Ex's. 21-A, 21-B,
21-C, 21-J, 22-V, 21-EE, 21-Y, 21-FF), all of which were
apparently charged to the contractor and agreed to by Berg
at the trial.

However, any charge over to the owners for

these items would be duplicative, since the work involved
was part of the original, or the amended, price fixed by
the construction contract.

In addition, Comstock admitted

that many items billed to the contractor by Comstock were
not completed.

Some items had even been refused by Berg

but were, nevertheless, included in Comstock's billings
(T. 557-559).

-21-
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....
When Murray left the job in October, it sent Berg
a bill for $7,050.00 representing the total amount it
claimed was due to it (Ex. 62, p. 7).

Based upon a doc-

ument prepared by its foreman, Mrs. Comstock maintained
that when Murray left there were only six apartments remaining to be wired (Ex. 116).

Mr.

Weaver, the Murray

foreman, testified, however, that he meant that there were
six apartments remaining to be rough wired.

Weaver furthe:

testified that rough wiring constituted approximately
40% of the job, and that in addition to the six apartments
there were numerous apartments that had to be finished,
which included the installation of the plugs and switches,
hanging the fixtures, etc.

(T. 1758-1759, 935-71).

Furthe:

Mr. Weaver testified, the outside wiring remained to be
done as did the elevators, recreation rooms, main services
air conditioners, furnaces, appliances and many other
(T. 1753-1755).

ite~

Mr. Bateman testified that when he came

onto the project in October he wired the kitchens, connected appliances, installed circuit breakers, installed
plugs and switches, wired the storage areas, elevators Md
recreational rooms and did all the exterior lighting.

In

addition, the air conditioners were connected in the sprin
(T. 1804-1812).
Although there were only two apartments added to
the original portion of the B building, Comstock apparent·
ly charged for three (T. 381, 478).

Comstock also chargee
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$865.00 "to add an apartment to Building c" (Ex. 21-U)
and also charged $195.10 for the subfeed to that added
apartment (Ex. 21-II).

Later, however, when Murray came

on the project it charged $875.00 for wiring the additional
22 units (Ex. 58-1).

Thus, the added apartment in the

c

building was charged for at least once by Comstock and once
again by Murray, as were the two extra apartments in
Building B.

Berg testified, however, that the wiring

charge for all the added apartments was included in the
total bid to the owners for the extra units (T. 2908).
Comstock submitted at least three tickets relating
to three-phase power for the elevators (T. 497, Ex's.
22-V, 21-P, 21-Z).

Nevertheless, one of the first changes

requested by Murray was to "install 3-phase power and
meter for elevator in Building A." (Ex. 58-2) •
phase wiring, however, was done by Mr.

The 3-

Bateman at the

owners' expense (T. 1833).
At the trial both Comstock and Murray produced
change orders for "wiring the rec. room" (T. 374, 595,
2952).

Comstock also charged Berg for the "added services"

to three of the additional apartments in the A and B buildings (T. 315, Ex. 21-A) and then later charged him for "12
additional services" in Building B (T. 353, Ex. 21-L).
Thus, Berg apparently agreed to pay twice for the services run to at least two apartments.

In addition, these

items were also included within the charge by Murray for
the additional 22 units.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

Comstock's charges to the contractor also containe
several items that clearly were not the owners' responsibi.
(Ex's. 21-N, 21-0, 26-65, T. 404).

In addition, one chang'

ticket which related to the elevator in Building A was
dated June 15, 1972, although that building originally did
not have an elevator and the decision to install one was
not made until sometime in August or September of that ye~
(T. 1503, 2925-2926).

Mrs. Schoppe, the apartment manager, testified
that many of the electrical outlets did not work and that
there were several instances where stoves and other appliances in the apartments had not even been wired (T.
2186, 2206-2207).

Mr. Weaver testified that he repaired

numerous items of Comstock's work that did not function
properly (935-88 to 935-90).

Bateman also testified that

he did a great deal of electrical repair work (T. 935-75).
Mr. Weaver testified that there should have been no charge
for correction of these errors (T. 1756).

Apparently,

however, there was (Ex's. 58-6 to 58-43).
The tickets submitted by Murray charging for this
repair work are revealing.

Exhibit 58-22, for instance,

which relates to the repair of a disposal contains the no·
tation "Hot lead not in wire nut."

Exhibit 58-16, a

Murray charge to repair a plug in a kitchen refrigerator
states, "Outlet box behind refrigerator not made up, both
hot leg and neutral left open in box."

Further, Exhibit

58-14, an "extra" to repair a duplex receptacle, states:
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"Found f~ed wires (hot and neutral)
tucked back ~n box. Neither were stripped
or had ever been connected to the duplex."
Other tickets contain similar notations and indicate
that Comstock made many mistakes in its wiring (Ex's. 58-10,
58-20).

Mr. Weaver recalled one instance where the refrig-

erator would not work unless the light was turned on (T.
1756).

These charges were apparently passed on to Berg

as "extras" but clearly were not the responsibility of the
owners.
Mrs. Comstock testified that the hourly charge for
her employees was $12.00/hour (T. 2375).

Some of the

Murray tickets, however, showed a charge greatly in excess
of that.

Fifteen minutes to repair a short, which was

probably guarantee work anyway, was billed at $12.00 (Ex.
58-43) which is an effective rate of $48.00/hour.

Other

tickets reflect similar charges (Ex's. 58-25 & 26, 58-23 &
24, 58-21 & 22, 58-17 & 18).

All of these charges were

apparently accepted by Berg at the trial.

In addition,

several of the tickets apparently making up the claim of
Comstock and Murray were never admitted into evidence
(Ex's. 21E, 21F).

Nevertheless, Berg also accepted those

"extras."
It is against this background of duplicate tickets,
charges for nonexistent work and work not completed,
varying rates, invoices relating to repair items and charges
for items that were not the owners' responsibility that
the Sponsored
testimony
of Mr. Berg must be considered.
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E.
errors.

The trial court committed serious evidentiary

The partnership's judgment was premised upon thre,

exhibits:

210, which was a schedule of "extras" to the

contract; 234, which was a schedule of the payments made
by the owners which the partnership "agreed" were chargeable to the contract; and 252, which was a summary of the
other two exhibits.

The jury used the precise figures

from Exhibit 252 in awarding its judgments.
During the course of the trial the electricians
found themselves in quite a dilemma.

They had submitted

a multitude of purported change orders and other letters
and documents in an attempt to establish their claim again:
the partnership but had been unable to get a summary of
their claims admitted; thus, the precise amount they were
claiming remained a mystery.

To this end, Exhibits 210

and 252, prepared by the surety and the partnership, solvei
this problem for the electricians and got to the jury a
figure it could easily pick out even though there was no
testimony to support it.

The admission of these exhibits

was erroneous because Berg lacked the necessary knowledge
to lay an adequate foundation for their admission, a fact
he readily admitted.
1.
foundation.

Exhibits were admitted without adequate

Exhibit 210 presented a lump sum figure for

claimed "electrical extras."

When quizzed about the spec·

ifics of that figure, Berg repeatedly testified that he
"wasn't
sure"
2908) provided
or by
"did
not
know"
(T.Services
2924)·
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When confronted with duplicate tickets and asked for which
ticket the owners

were being charged, how much and whether

the same item was being charged twice, Berg stated over
and over again that he did not know (T. 2902, 2906-2909,
2916 I

2923-2924

I

2929-29301 2935-29351 2938-2939

I

2942)

0

Berg stated he was "not familiar" with the list of extras
from Cosrntock (T. 2905).

Although Berg acknowledged that

it would be an error to charge for the duplicated items,
he could not state that that had not been done (T. 2919,
2942).

Berg stated that he took the figures from

the electrician and was relying on him (T. 2909).

When

asked by the trial court whether there was any document
he would like to review before he proceeded further, Berg
responded that he had to get an accounting from the electrician (T. 2910).

When pressed for an explanation of

the $40,069.01 figure, which was on the exhibit from which
the jury took the figure awarded against the owners, Berg
declared that it was not his figure and stated repeatedly
that the figures were those of the electrician (T.
2931-2932).

2924,

The electrician, however, had also repeat-

edly testified that he did not know the details of the figures.
Although Berg did admit that certain charges, including some $19,250.00 for wiring the additional units, would
be an extra to the contractor from the electrician but
would not be properly chargeable to the owners since it
was included in the fixed price for the extra units, he
could not say whether or not that $19,250.00 was, in fact,
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included in the figure for electrical extras shown on the
exhibits (T. 2935-2936, 2942-2943).
Berg testified that he did not think it should be
an extra to the owners to get the electrical current to
the added units (T. 2905), and that the bid for the extra
elevator was for one that worked when tne buttons were
pushed and that it would not work without electricity (T.
2924-2925).

Berg further testified that no extra charge

was being made for extending the air conditioner feeds
(T. 2916), yet, all these items were apparently included
in the electrician's charges to the contractor and passed
on to the owners (Ex's. 21-A, 21-L, 22-V, 22-SS, 22-RR).
Plaintiffs submit that they were entitled to know
the composition of the lump sum electrical figure on the
exhibits and that it is not too much to ask that any clahe
damages be stated in sufficient detail so that the owners
could ascertain what items had been excluded or included
in that figure.

Mr. Berg could not tell whether Plaintiff:

had been charged once, twice, three times or four times
for some items

(T. 2931); whether they were charged for

mistakes of other subcontractors; whether they were charge:
for items not done; whether they were charged for those
items Berg said were not extras to them or whether they
were, in fact, charged for items for which Berg testified
that no charge was being made.

Further, Plaintiffs could

not tell whether they had received a credit for those
items acknowledged by Mr.

Comstock (T. 369-371), or for
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work that had not been done.2
Rule 19 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
.

"As a prerequisite for the testimony of a
on a relevant or material matter there
must be evidence that he has personal kn~wledge
thereof."
w~tness

The record is clear that Berg had absolutely no
knowledge of the contents of the electrical figure in
Exhibit 210.

In fact, he admitted that it carne from someone

else; clearly, Berg lacked the required personal knowledge
for the exhibits to be admitted.

Plaintiffs timely inter-

posed an objection to the admission of the exhibit setting
forth the grounds enumerated herein (T.

2628, 2307),

nevertheless, the trial court received that exhibit over
Plaintiffs' objections.

Plaintiffs also timely objected to

the admission of Exhibit 252 (which was a summary of the
conclusions contained in Exhibits 210 and 234 (T. 3077)),
because of the defects in Exhibit 210 and because it did
not meet the statutory requirements of §78-25-16(5);
nevertheless, the court also admitted that exhibit (T.
3077-3078).

There can be no dispute that those exhibits

had a substantial impact in bringing about the verdict
since the jury awards corresponded to the penny with the
amounts set forth therein (R. Cl017, 1033, 1037).

This

pivotal evidentiary error alone would require sending the
2Even if there remained only six apartments to be
wired, a position that is clearly not supported by the evidence, a credit therefor would come to $5,250.00 (6 x
$875.00).
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damages issues between the owners and the contractor back
for a new trial.
Plaintiffs submit that the admission of those exhibits were contrary to the rules of evidence and the
statutes of this state, and were prejudicial to their cause
By claiming a lack of knowledge concerning the details of
the exhibit, Berg was able to thwart any effective investigation into the possibility that the figures were
erroneous while not suffering any adverse affect because
of this lack of knowledge.

If this type of conduct is

sanctioned by this Court, future witnesses in this state
will need only claim lack of knowledge, either real or
feigned, to the details of any exhibit, in order to stifle
cross-examination, while at the same time receiving the
benefits of the unsupported exhibit.
2.
into evidence.

Blatantly erroneous exhibits were allowed
Another evidentiary error was committed

by the court with relation to Exhibit 235 and Exhibit 251,
which was its visual counterpart.
Mr. Mark Hatch testified that Exhibit 23 5 represen~

ed an analysis of the draws and disbursements on the Inclir
Terrace project.

Mr.

Hatch readily admitted, however,

that the "checks paid" column included only those items
"chargeable to Berg."

What was "chargeable to Berg" was

derived by Mr. Hatch from the testimony of Dwayne Liddell
with certain "adjustments"

(T. 3025, 3086).
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!rr. Liddell, however, indicated that his calculations did not cover all expenditures on the project.
His testimony went only to those expenditures that were
attributable to the contractor; therefore, items that
were outside the construction contract, such as landscaping,
carpets,

drapes,

demolition, swimming pool, etc., were

excluded from his calculations (T. 1712-1713, 1722, 1729).
From !IT. Liddell's figures !IT. Hatch further deducted
some $85,000.00 of actual cash payments by the owners
for such items as additional painting, concrete and electrical work and cleanup.

Because a portion of the construc-

tion was assumed by the owners and paid for directly by
them, the expenditures for those items were not reflected
in !IT. Hatch's exhibit, although the funds borrowed to
pay for those items appeared as draws.

Thus, as presented

in the exhibit, the "checks paid" amount actually reflected
considerably less than was actually paid by the owners for
a project free from defects.

The "loan receipts" column,

on the other hand, included all funds deposited into the
Incline Terrace account by the lending institutions.
The exhibits were contrived in such a way that "checks
paid" would never equal "draws" because of the different
composition of the two columns; therefore, they presented the erroneous impression that the owners had withdrawn substantial sums of money from the project.

While

Lignell did admit that some funds were withdrawn, the
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Library Services and Technology-31Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testimony was uncontroverted that it was done with the
approval of the lender and that all funds were paid back
plus an additional $211,000.00

(T. 1510, 1648-1649, 1800).

l-ir. Hatch acknowledged that the exhibit was not
accurate

(T. 3088, 3107-3110) and that many more funds had

expended on the project than his exhibits showed.

Further,

Mr. Hatch admitted that a considerable amount of the
"draws" may not have actually been received by the owners (T. 3089, 3098-3106) and that the "draws" column was
in fact, overstated (T. 3114).
The court, over the objections of Plaintiffs,
nevertheless admitted the exhibits into evidence (T. 3026·
3032).

Plaintiffs submit that the exhibits were not a

fair analysis of the evidence, were based upon erroneous
conclusions and were prepared solely for the purpose of
inflaming the jury.

These exhibits and the erroneous

implications they conveyed most assuredly misled the
jury and were extremely prejudicial to Plaintiffs; their
admission was clearly error.
F.

Omrnissions by the contractor or subcontractors

in their bids and construction blunders were erroneously
passed through to the owners.

Mr. Berg testified that

the joint venture had a fixed price contract with the
owners and that if an item were more than the subcontractor's bid, it would be stuck with it; if less, it would
make a greater profit (T. 1068-1069).

In the instant case,
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however, when an item turned out to be m::>re than the bid
it was passed through to the owners in the form of an
"extra."
Lignell received a firm price bid for the additional
elevator in Building A.

Although Berg testified that the

price included a properly functioning elevator, he apparently
passed through as an "extra" the cost of wiring the elevator so it would work.
The owners received a "fixed price" bid for the
22 additional apartment units.

Berg testified that this

included the wiring (T. 2943), but then later changed his
mind and testified that that price did not include getting
the electricity to the apartments.

Berg also testified that

the extension of the air conditioner feeds was included

in the bid for the extra units but apparently this cost
was also passed through to the owners. 3
Lignell testified that the price quoted him by Berg
for the recreation room in the C building was $8,000.00
(T. 3292-3294).

At the trial a charge was made on Exhibit

210 for an additional $3,000.00 for a furnace in that room
although the plans from the very beginning showed a furnace
was required (T. 2673-2674) and Mr. Hatch admitted that
there had never been a similar charge by the subcontractor
for that item (T. 3127).

Apparently, the cost of wiring

3Berg apparently passed on to the owners whatever
electrical charges came to him, regardless of the source
or cause and without distinguishing whether they were already
included in the construction contract (T. 2517, 2951).
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the recreation room was also added to the list of "extras"
although the original plans provided for numerous electric
outlets and switches in that area (T. 2937).
The range hood fans were listed by brand name ~d
model number on the specifications.

Berg testified that

they were a part of the contract (T. 1164) .

The electri-

cian acknowledged that he knew about them before he submit:
his bid (T. 510) and the Comstock bid sheets contained
numerous references to the hood fans

(Ex. 43) •

Neverthe-

less, this, too, was apparently lumped into Berg's list of
extras (Ex. 210), although Mr. Weaver testified that the
hood fans were not connected when he left the project (T.

935-100).

In addition, although Berg knew that hood

f~s

were required prior to the time that he submitted the bid
for the additional 22 units and the addendum was signed
(T. 2922) , he also apparently charged an extra for wiring
the hood fans in those additional 22 units.
The sheet metal subcontractor "forgot" to include
bath fans in his bid, Berg testified.

It was undisputed,

however, that the bath fans were on the plans from the
very beginning; nonetheless, an "extra" was charged to
the owners for that item (Ex. 210).
Berg admitted that in October, 1971, he was aware
that the City required wet and dry standpipes, stairs to
the roof, enclosed stairs and other items to be installed
in the building.

After obtaining that knowledge, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-34Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

construction contract was executed.

Berg made no changes

or modifications in the bid to the owners although he
stated that he went over it several times to make sure
it was right

(T. 2678).

The items required by the City

were also passed through to Lignell and Todd as "extras"
(Ex. 210).
Berg was erroneously informed by a city building
inspector that certain fire doors were not required.
they were on the plans, Berg did not put them in.

Although

There-

after, the lender's architect determined that as built,
the building did not meet the fire code and that the fire
doors would have to be installed (T. 1572-1573, 3358-3360).
The cost of redoing the work and hanging the fire doors
was passed to the owners as an "extra."
G.

The contractor's accounting was erroneous.

Although "extras" were liberally passed on to the owners
the owners charges usually fell victim to certain "adjustments" by the contractor's accountant.

Thus, a $3,000.00

retaining wall that was on the plans but not built (T.~~)
was grudgingly "accepted" as a back charge by the contractor in the amount of $1,000.00 (Ex. 210).
of other work that was

~

Some $60,000.00

done, however, was completely

ignored (T. 2254, 3308-3313, Ex. 207, 257) •
Actual out-of-pocket expenditures to complete the
project and cure the defects, amounting to some $75,000.00,
primarily for painting, concrete and electrical work, were
-35-
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likewise omitted from the con t rae t or • s accounting (Ex's.
153, 210, 234).

Further, Mr. Hatch admitted that the

schedule of charges "acceptable" to the contractor (Ex.
234), was based on 21 additional units when, in fact,
there were really 22

(T. 3125-3126).

Mrs. Schoppe, the apartment manager, was hired by
Berg to do the heavy construction cleaning of the apartments

(T. 2197, 2221).

She hauled lumber and debris,

chipped gobs of plaster and glue out of the tubs and off
of the cabinets and scraped paint off of the windows.

Trn

value of the construction cleaning was placed at $3,675.0·:
(T. 2213).

Apparently, because she was paid directly for

work by the owners, that too was excluded.
Mr. Berg testified that the maximum profit expect!
from the project was $56,000.00

(T. 1067).

Since the con·

tract amounted to $1,455,000.00 this would have been a
margin of 3. 84%.

Nevertheless, Exhibit 210 claimed a 151

markup, amounting to $12,726.07, on the "extras" of selec·
subcontractors because that was "standard" in the communi·
ty (T. 2625).

Berg did not testify, however, that he

expected to make that markup on the subcontractors' work
on the project.

In addition, Berg could not and did not

differentiate between those subcontractors' "extras" that
were included in the fixed price bid for the additionall:
units and those that were not (T. 2628).

In spite of

this, the partnership was allowed to recover the requeste:
15%
on Funding
the forjoint
price
contract.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP.
The entry of a judgment against Plaintiffs and in
favor of Berg Brothers Construction Company, the partnership, constituted clear error because:
A.

The construction contract which is the subject

of this action was between Plaintiffs and a joint venture
called Berg Construction Company.
B.

Berg Construction Company is a different legal

entity than Berg Brothers Construct~on Company.
C.

Any confusion in names should be chargeable to

the Bergs, who chose the names utilized.
D.

The joint venture, the entity which was the

only defendant in the suit which is the subject of this
appeal, made no counterclaim.
E.

The Defendant joint venture, the partnership,

the partners constituting said partnership, and the individual Frank

c.

Berg, are all estopped to deny the

existence of the joint venture and the fact that the joint
venture was the contracting party to the construction
contract and the performance bond.
The error complained of herein was raised by a
Motion to Strike, a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion for Directed
Verdict, a Motion to Reconsider, Objections to Instructions,
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1

Proposed Instruction, a Motion for Judgment Notwi thstandi:
the Verdict and a Motion for New Trial
3203, 3235-3251, 3383, R. Cl360-1364).

(T . 25 44, 3196In each instance

the trial court ruled against Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

contend that the trial court erred on this point at each
stage of the proceedings, culminating in the award

of~

erroneous judgment and the erroneous denial of the Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

The heading of

this point is intended to embrace in one argument the
entire series of errors on this point.
A.

The entities involved in the construction

contract were not properly distinguished by the trial
court.

Other than Plaintiffs there were three separate

legal entities involved in the written construction contract which is the subject of this litigation (Ex. 9).
One is an individual;one is a partnership
joint venture.

and one is a

Because all are of the family Berg and

because they chose to do business in ways which are very
similar, there was a great potential for confusion ruoong
the separate entities, particularly between the ongoing
construction partnership between Cliff and Bill Berg and
the joint venture formed between them and their brother
Frank Berg for the sole purpose of handling the one con·
struction project which is the subject of this litigation
4Although Cliff Berg testified that he had built
other apartments with his older brother (T. 1006), thl~
particular joint venture was to terminate upon completlon
subject
project
\T.
2660).
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Those legal entities are:
1.

Frank C. Berg, an individual;

2.

Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a part-

nership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction company, and
3.

Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, a part-

nership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company, and
Frank C. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg
Construction Company.

The underlining has been added to

point up the two entities which the trial court persistently, and erroneously, failed to distinguish from one another,
and the confusing similarity of their names.
indicates, and counsel's

observat~on

The record

of the trial court's

handling of this matter affirms, that the trial court
didn't recognize that the two names denominated separate
legal entities until September 23, 1976 (T. 3066-3068), at
which time he felt it to be too late in the trial to
change his prior stance.
B.

The failure to distinguish between the joint

venture and the partnership was prejudicial to Plaintiffs.
The obfuscation of the distinction between the joint venture and the partnership was critically prejudicial to
Plaintiffs for the following reasons.
(a)

The joint venture never, at any time, had a

contractor's license in utah or elsewhere.

This was known

~

to all parties very early in the litigation and the joint
venture recognized the effect of being unable to so plead.
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{b)

A counterclaim by the Defendant joint ventur:

would have been subject to dismissal for lack of a contractor's license--a defense that was recognized in
dismissing the claim of Western Drywall (an unlicensed
partnership) against the Plaintiff owners.

Bcvr"l Bro\'1-er.;,

(The partners;

however, refused to raise the issue of lack of license; a:
result, Western Drywall's claim against it was not dismis:
and ultimately ripened into a judgment.)
(c)

Dismissal of the joint venture's counterclair

would have defeated the bonding company's claim over agai:
the owners, so the bonding company had an interest in
perpetuating the confusion over the legal entities.
(d)

Instead of counterclaiming for the joint

venture, the counterclaim was carefully drawn to be that
of only Clifford and William Berg, d/b/a Berg Brothers
Construction Company, a partnership, one of the two entities comprising the joint venture.

Prior to the trial,

all counsel believed that this partnership had a valid
Utah Contractor's License when the construction agreement
was made and performed, so that the contractor and bondin1
company believed that the ploy of thus limiting the counti
claim would finesse the fatal flaw in the joint venture's
power to recover on the construction contract.

[As is

fully developed in Point V below, it was discovered durin:
trial that the partnership did not have a valid Utah
Contractor's License, but the trial court refused to adnli:
evidence
on Law
that
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The contractor and bonding company correctly predicted the effect of their ploy.

The trial court did not

catch the finesse and the contractor and bonding company
achieved what must, indeed, be a judicial rarity--a
partnership which had no contractual relation with the
owners recovered a judgment based upon a contract between
the owners and an unlicensed third party, to-wit, the
joint venture.

Indeed, the partnership which recovered

the judgment was not even a party to the action in which
it recovered the judgment (See Amended Complaint R. BlBl-188,
R. C636-643).

As a simple reading of the Amended Complaint

shows, the single Defendant named

there~n

was the joint

venture, and the partnership was named solely in its capacity as a joint venturer--one of those who formed together
for the limited venture.

A careful reading of the transcript

shows that there is no evidence whatever of any agreement
between the owners and the partnership, Berg Brothers
Construction Company.

On that point the jury had no con-

flicting evidence to weigh.

The joint venture made no

counterclaim and the counterclaimant had no contract

(T. 2558).

c.

The Defendants should be estopped to deny the

existence of the joint venture.

The Defendants, in justi-

fying the interposition of~ of the joint venturers,
have claimed that no joint venture existed because Frank

c.

Berg did not sign a written joint venture agreement,

de3pite
the multitude of documents admittedly signed
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by the joint venture and all of the joint venturers.
Plaintiffs have responded that, even if it were true that
Frank C. Berg did not sign the proposed written joint
venture agreement, he and the partnership were estopped tc
deny the existence of the joint venture.

The issue of

estoppel was put to the jury, which decided it adversely
to the Plaintiffs.
When the evidence was in, Plaintiffs moved for a
directed verdict in their favor on the counterclaim because (a)

the joint venture made no counterclaim (the onl;

counterclaim made was the one pleaded by the partnership,
Berg Brothers Construction Company (R. A21-27; R. C827833; T. 2558)) and (b)

the parties to the joint venture

were, on the evidence adduced, estopped to deny the existence of the joint venture.

That motion was denied,

objections were timely made to Proposed Instructions
per~itting

the counterclaim of the partnership to be

considered by the jury, instructions of estoppel as a
matter of law were proposed by Plaintiffs, and refused by
the trial court, Motions for a New Trial and for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict were made and denied.

Every·

thing necessary to preserve consideration of this matter
on appeal was done.
The undisputed evidence required a ruling of
estoppel as a matter of law:
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(a)

The written Construction Agreement was between

the Plaintiff owners and the joint venture

(Ex. 9).

(Copies

of the face page and the signature page of that Exhibit
are included in the appendix.)

Frank

c.

Berg had been

consulted about the project and knew the bonding company
required his assets and credit on the construction contract
(T.

3183-3134).
(b)

The performance bond, issued by the Defendant

bonding company for the benefit of the Plaintiffs and
verified to Plaintiffs' lenders, showed the joint venture
as the principal and the Plaintiff owners as the obligee
(Ex. 18).

(An exact copy of this document is included in

the appendix. )
(c)

Frank C. Berg personally signed an application

for that performance bond (Ex. 255).

(A copy of the front

and signature pages are included in the appendix.)
testified that he didn't

He

know whether the document was

,
,
, bCA+h
,
f ~lled in when he s~gned ~t,,..that he kneww at ~twas

to be used for (T. 3183).
(d)

When it carne time to close the permanent loan

and pay off the construction loan, there were still unpaid
bills, liened or lienable.

The Plaintiff owners had arranged

for funds borrowed by them to be deposited with Title
Insurance Agency so that lienable claims could be paid and
the permanent financing closed.

Mr. Keith Ellertson, pres-

ident of Title Insurance Agency, testified that he had custody
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of the funds of the owners and that he required certain
written affirmances before he would release the sum of
$115,576.10 belonging to Plaintiffs and being held by him,

Those affirmances consist of Exhibit 164, signed and sworr.
to by Clifford Berg on behalf of the joint venture, and
Exhibit 165, signed on behalf of the joint venture by ~1
three natural persons involved in the joint venture,
Clifford, William and Frank C. Berg.

(Copies of these

documents are incorporated in the appendix.)

l1r.

Ellertson testified that he relied on these documents
signed for the joint venture by all natural persons invalved in it, disbursed the $115,576.10 in reliance
thereon (Ex. 162) and would not have so disbursed the
money but for those documents

(T. 1666-1667).

This took

place February 1, 197 4, at the close of the construction
phase.
D.

All participants executed documents acknowled•

the existence of the joint venture.
Affidavit sworn to by Clifford Berg.

Exhibit 164 is an
It recites:

11
2.
He is a partner in Berg Brothers Constructior
Company and is a member of that certain joint vent
doing business as Berg Construction Company.

3. He is authorized to execute documents ?n beh<
of Berg Construction Company which are bind~ng, up:
the said joint venture, all participants ~herel~:
all members thereof. 11 (Ex. 164, page 1, l~nes 5 1.
Thereafter he lists the persons to whom the Plaintiffs' ~
should be paid, affirming there to be no other liens or ~
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which could result in liens on the project.
Exhibit 165 subordinates the lien rights of the
joint venture to those of Traveler's Insurance company,
the permanent lender, and Zions First National Bank, another lender.

It is significant in that it recites that the

joint venture, Berg Construction Company, subordinates its
liens and claims and in that it bears the signatures of
all three of the brothers under the following designation:
"Clifford Berg & William Berg, d/b/a Berg
Brothers Construction, a partnership and Frank
Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a
Berg Construction Company. By /s/ Clifford M.
Berg; By /s/ William Berg; and By /s/ Frank c.
Berg. (Ex. 165, page 1)
All three of the Berg Brothers either testified that their
signatures were genuine and they knew the contents of the
documents and that they would be relied upon in disbursing
the Plaintiffs' moneylor such was stipulated to by their
counsel (T. 1684, 3185).
E.

There was no contrary evidence respecting the

joint venture.

This Court has only recently had an occasion

to reaffirm the necessity for making a clear and precise
distinction among entities involved in multi-entity transactions.

In Mullins v. Evans, 560 P.2d 1116, (Utah 1977),

the court distinguished among Ralph M. Evans, an individual,
R. M. Evans and Company, Inc., and Royal Industries Corporation, Inc.

Reversing a judgment in favor of one Mullins

against Ralph M. Evans, the individual, and Royal Industries
Corporation, the court noted:
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'.'If anybody owed any obligation to Mr.
Mulllns, it was the R. M. Evans Company, Inc.,
but that company was not made a party to this
action." Mullins v. Evans,
supra.
In the instant case, if anybody has a claim against the
Plain tiffs i t was the joint venture, but the joint venture
made no counterclaim.
The errors embraced in the above rulings and judg·
ment compel reversal.

The multitude of arguments in the

ensuing points, alone and in combination, support that vie
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF THE PARTNERSHIP, BERG
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
In spite of the fact that the law of the State of
Utah is clear that in the absence of an agreement or

~

express authorization by statute, attorney's fees cannot
be awarded, Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498

(Utah 1976);

Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953); ~
v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 433, 394 P.2d 77 (1964), the trial
court after a hearing, and somewhat at variance with its
Memorandum Decision, awarded judgment for attorney's fees
to the bonding company and to Berg Brothers Construction
Company, the partnership, against the owners, in the s~
of $74,000.00.

The Memorandum Decision (R. 1395-7) sets

out the trial court's rationale and determination on the
matter of attorney's fees as follows:
[The Court finds and concludes]
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"4.

That Wes~ern~ Bailey, Murray, Comstock,
B~rg.& F1del1ty.are the successful parties
w1th1n the prov1sions of Chapter 14 u c A
1953.
I
•I
0

0

5.

That Western & Bailey are entitled to recover from Berg & Fidelity the sum of
$11,000.00 attorneys' fees who in turn
are entitled to recover a like amount from
plaintiffs Lignell & Todd.

6.

That Murray & Comstock are entitled to recover
from Berg & Fidelity the sum of $21,000.00
attorneys' fees who in turn are entitled to
recover a like amount from plaintiffs Lignell
and Todd.

7.

That Berg is entitled to recover from Lignell
& Todd the sum of $21,000.00 attorneys' fees.

8.

That Fidelity is entitled to recover from
Lignell & Todd the sum of $21,000.00 attorneys'
fees."

It is noteworthy that, even at this late stage, no
attempt was made by the trial court to distinguish between
the partnership and the joint venture.

The court simply

used the all-embracing, non-specific term "Berg" in a
Memorandum Decision adjudicating $74,000.00 in attorney's
fees and some $25,000.00 in interest.
A.

There was no contract which provided for an

award of attorney's fees.

Prior to this decision many is-

sues which should have foreclosed the question of attorney's
fees as it related to Plaintiffs had been resolved.

The

written contract upon which the suit of Lignell and Todd
was based was not with the entity to whom the attorney's
fees were awarded and did not provide for attorney's fees
(Ex. 9).

The contract upon which the suit between Lignell
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and Todd and Fidelity was based, the performance bond, siJn.
ilarly made no provision for attorney's fees

(Supp. T. 44,

In addition, the contract upon which the subco~

Ex. 18).

tractors had sued Fidelity, the Labor and Material Bond,
contained an express provision assuring Lignell and Todd
against costs and expenses in suits upon that bond (Ex.
18) •

Since no tort claim was made by the contractor or thi

bonding company against Lignell and Todd, Plaintiffs submit that there was no rational basis upon which the attorm
fees could be awarded.
B.

Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in all

suits brought by the subcontractors against them.

While

a portion of the suits by the electrical subcontractors
and the drywallers and materialmen were actions brought
under §14-2, et seq., Plaintiffs were not involved in
those portions of the consolidated cases.

As between the

Plaintiffs and the electrical subcontractors, Murray and
Comstock, all issues submit ted to the jury were determined
in favor of the Plaintiffs, resulting in a verdict and
judgment of no cause of action, and Lignell-Todd were
awarded their costs as the successful
1421, 1436-1437, 1451).

party (R. Cl35S-131

As between the Plaintiffs and

we

drywall subcontractor and supplier, Western and Bailey, aL
issues submitted to the jury were similarly determined
in favor of the Plaintiffs, resulting in a judgment of
no cause of action, and Lignell-Todd were likewise awarded
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their costsS (R. Cl421) .

I n b o th those cases, if attorney's

fees were to have been awardable, they must necessarily have
been awarded to the Plaintiffs,

not against them.

Since

Title 14 (erroneously called "Chapter 14" by the court)
provides, where applicable, that attorney's fees "shall
be taxed as costs in the action," the intent of the statute would appear to preclude taxing the Comstock-MurrayWestern-Bailey attorney's fees, amounting to some $32,000.00,
against Lignell and Todd, the prevailing party to whom costs
had been awarded as an adjunct to their judgments of "no
cause. "

It further seems clear that, had those "labor and

rna te rial bond" actions not been con so 1 ida ted with the
Lignell-Todd suit on the construction contract, the matter
as to that $32,000.00 of the attorney's fees would have
been totally and finally foreclosed in each separate action,
favorably to Lignell and Todd.

Plaintiffs submit that the

mere fact that the cases were consolidated should not
obligate them to pay the attorney's fees for all parties
J.nvolved.
The record is clear that in spite of the consolidation neither the trial court nor the various parties considered Lignell and Todd to be participants in the suits
by the subcontractors on the labor and material bonds (T.
263-264).

Nevertheless, in a curious and inexplicable

Splaintiffs also prevailed on the question of a
mechanics lien asserted by Western and Bailey thereby
making Plaintiffs the "successful party" under §38-1-18.
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feat of legal gymnastics, the trial court, after properly
awarding attorney's fees against the bonding company in
the "contractor's bond" suits, transferred the burden of
the bonding company's loss to Lignell and Todd in the
Memorandum Decision by simply adding the words "who in tun
are entitled to recover a like amount from Plaintiffs
Lignell and Todd."

This despite the fact that no legal

theory for such a pass-through had ever been pleaded,

~d

no issues respecting an award over had ever been tried.
C.

The statutory attorney's fees relate only to

direct claims premised on a labor and material bond.

The

subject statute, §14-2 et seq., was enacted to protect
subcontractors, laborers and materialmen.

Crane Company

v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837
(1959); Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208
P. 2d 1127

(1949).

As far as the partnership is concerned

Plaintiffs brought no bond action of any kind against the[;
theirs was a contract action.

Plaintiffs did sue surety

on the performance bond, but that can in no way be construi
to be an action on the labor and material bond, further,
surety cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be deeme:
to be a "subcontractor or a materialman."
Section 14-2-1, "Action on bond to protect rnechan·
ics and rna terialmen," requires an owner to obtain from a
contractor a bond equal to the contract price running to
the owner and others, and provides

a direct right of ac·

tion
onQuinney
theLawbond
against
the
surety
for
those
who
have
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furnished materials or performed labor.
Section 14-2-2, provides for direct liability
against an owner who fails to post the bond.

This liability

is limited, however, to persons who have furnished materials
or performed labor.
Section 14-2-3 provides as follows:
"Action on bond to protect mechanics and
materlalmen--Attorney's fee.--In any action
brought upon the bond prov1ded for under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be
fixed by the court, which shall be-taxed as
costs in the action." (emphasis added).
Combined for trial in this case were:

(1)

The action by subcontractor Western and mat-

erialman Bailey on the Labor and Material Payment Bond,
and other assorted claims;
(2)

The action by subcontractors Murray and

Comstock on the Labor and Material Payment Bond; and other
claims not within the provisions of the bonding statute;
and,
(3)

The action by Lignell and Todd on the construe-

tion contract as to the Defendant joint venture and the
performance bond as to Fidelity, the bonding company.
The only actions "brought upon the bond provided
for under this chapter [Chapter 14-2]" were portion of (1)
and (2) next above.

Hence, they are the only actions to

which §14-2-3 can, by its very terms, have any application.
Action

(3) above was on the performance bond purchased by

the owners for their own protection.

This is not a "bond
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provided for under this chapter. "
Western, Bailey, Comstock and Murray were the
"successful party" as the term is used in §14-2-3 against
Berg Construction and Fidelity, and properly recovered
attorney's fees.

In those actions, the ones to which

§14-2-3 applies, Lignell and Todd were the "successful
parties" as noted above, adjudged such and awarded costs.
Clearly there is no statutory basis for an award of fees
against them.

No contract or tort basis was even claimed

by the contractor or surety.

It follows that the award of

attorney's fees against Todd and Lignell was erroneous

~d

should be set aside.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in
this award in a number of respects, to-wit:
(a)

No award of any kind should have been made

to the partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company,
for the reasons set forth in Point II above, since that
entity was not a party to any contract with the Plaintiffs
and should not have been permitted any standing in the sui·
(b)

There was no contract between Plaintiffs ~d

any of the Defendants providing for the award of attorney''
fees.

Although lack of such a contract would be immateria

to the award of attorney's fees to a subcontractor against
the bonding company under §14-2-3, it would be necessary
to show that such a contract existed between the suretY
and the owners in order to charge those fees over against
Lignell and Todd.
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(c)

The trial court erred in ruling that the

provisions of Chapter (sic] 14, U.C.A., authorize an award
of attorney's fees between the contractor and the owners
and the surety and the owners.

While Section 14-2-3 per-

mits an award of attorney's fees between the subcontractors
and the bonding company in cases where a bond has been
posted, where, as here, the owners have actually furnished
the bond required by §14-2-1, they have met their entire
burden and the bond is exculpatory as to them.
(d)

Section 14-2-3 only provides for an award of

attorney's fees in an action brought upon a bond to protect
mechanics and materialmen.

No such action was brought by

or against Plaintiffs.
(e)

Even if the contentions in (a), (b),

(c) and

(d) above were decided by this Court against the Plaintiffs,
there would still be no legal basis for awarding judgment
against Plaintiffs for the attorney's fees awarded to the
subcontractors against the contractor and bonding company
under §14-2-3.
(f)

§14-2-3 provides, where applicable, for

attorney's fees to be taxed as costs.

As previously noted,

Plaintiffs were awarded their costs against the electrical
subcontractor and the drywall subcontractor and supplier,
and this precludes assessing the subcontractors' $32,000.00
in attorney's fees over against Lignell and Todd.
(g)

The Labor and Material Payment Bond with the
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joint venture as principal and the bonding company as sur
provided with respect to suits by unpaid subcontractors
and materialmen that the owner (Plaintiffs Lignell

and To:

would not be liable for the payment of any costs or expenses of any such suit.

Plaintiffs are entitled to the

benefit of that bond provision as a duly enforceable con·
tract covenant (See sub-point E of this Point III).

The

Labor and Material Bond containing that provision was
found to have been properly executed and delivered (See
sub-point D of this Point III).
D.

Plaintiffs posted the necessary bond and

should have been exonerated from liability.

The rationalE

of the trial court is clear from its Memorandum Decision,
but represents a lack of precision of analysis and an

~

warranted expansion of the reach of Chapter 14-2 that
would, if affirmed by this Court, furnish a whole new fiei
for the recovery of attorney's fees in construction cases.
The trial court awarded the subcontractors' , the contrac·
tor's and the bonding company's attorney's fees against
an Owner who had complied with Chapter 14-2 and had
furnished a full, valid and sufficient bond.
no precedent for such a result.

There is

The rule in this state

is that once an owner furnishes the bond required by
Chapter 14-2, he is exonerated from liability.

That such

is the law in Utah is made clear by the holding in two
cases dealing with this statute.
In Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin, supra, tried
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by Judge Ellett, the surety defended claiming that unpaid
materialmen could not recover directly against it.

Sec-

tions 17-2-1 and 17-2-2, U.C.A., 1943, the statutes involved, were the same as the present §§14-2-1 and 14-2-2.
A bond had been provided by the owner which the bonding
company claimed to be inadequate to meet the requirements
of §17-2-1.

The court held against the bonding company.

In reaching its decision this Court dealt with the effect
of an owner furnishing the bond required by the statute.
The salient portion reads as follows:
"We have hereinabove discussed the sufficiency
of the bond as a common law obligation to sustain the right of the mater~almen to sue.
It
is also sufficient under the statute· to exonerate
the owner of l~ab~lity.
Title 17 of our statutes was enacted for the protection of laborers
and materialmen. Liberty Coal & Lumber Co.
v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 341, and Bamberger
co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah
194, 48 P.2d 489. By its prov~sions, they, on
default of the contractor, are given recourse,
in the alternative, against the owner o1· the
sureties on the contractor's bond."
(emphasis
added).
Id. at 1132.
The alternative referred to is an action (1) against the
owner if he fails to post the bond or (2) against the surety
if the owner does post the bond.
In Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 P.2d 837,
(1956), this court held an owner who failed to post the bond
liable to an unlicensed subcontractor and stated (at page
838) :
"This is particularly true when we consider
the fact that the owner could have avoided any
personal obligation ha~ he hims7lf complied with
14-2-1,
supra.
(emphas~s
added)
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That Plaintiff owners, Lignell and Todd, furnished a valic
and sufficient bond is undisputed.

Finding No. 8 at ~

Cl412, reads:
"8. Berg Construction Company as Principal
and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland as
Surety executed and delivered a Labor and
Material Payment Bond and a Performance Bond
at the request of the owners of the Incline
Terrace and in compliance with Chapter 2 of
Title 14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Said
bond is dated February 16, 1972, and is in the
face amount of $1,351,755.00."
It follows that Lignell and Todd were exonerated from lia·
bili ty to Murray-Comstock-Western and Bailey.

There is nc

exception to the exoneration rule for attorney's fees

~d

the Legislature has not provided for any round-about route
to the owners' pocketbook through the contractor or suret1
E.

Surety contracted with Plaintiffs that they

would not be liable for any costs relative to suits on
the material bond.

Not only does the Utah law exonerate

the Plaintiffs from liability for the attorney's fees,
but, in addition thereto, the bonding company ("Fidelity'
in the Memorandum Decision) specifically contracted with
the Plaintiffs that they would not be liable for any oft
costs or expenses of any suits brought by subcontractors
on that particular bond.

The Labor and Material Payment

Bond (2nd page of Ex. 18) contains the following provisio"
"The above named Principal [Berg Construction
Co.] and Surety [Fidelity] hereby jointly and
severally agree with the Owner [Lignell and
Todd] that every claimant as herein defined,_
who has not been paid in full before the expHa·
tion of a period of ninety (90) days after the
date on which the last of such claimant's work
or
labor
was
done provided
or by
performed,
materials
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
the Institute of Museumor
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-56-

werefurnished by such claimant, may sue on
this bond for the use of such claimant
prosecute the suit to final judgment f~r
such sum or sums as may be justly due claimant, and have execution thereon. The owner
shall not be liable for the payment of any
cost~ or expenses of any such suit." (Emphas~s & bracketed material added.)
Certainly one of the costs or expenses that must have been
contemplated by the parties at that time was attorney's
fees.
F.

Consolidation of the actions should not make

Plaintiffs responsible for all parties' attorney's fees.
The Defendants argued, and the court evidently held, that
since the actions were combined, everyone in them became
parties to "an action brought upon the bond provided for
under this chapter," thereby making Lignell and Todd liable
for the attorney's fees of all the parties involved.

Plain-

tiffs submit that consolidation for trial does not alter
the substantive rights of the parties to the consolidated
actions.

If the court's ruling on attorney's fees were

to be sustained, a new and substantial substantive change
would occur in the rights of anyone whose action was consolidated for trial with a labor or material claim being
pursued under a Chapter 14-2 bond.

Such person, dragged

against his will into other multiple suits, would run the
risk of having to pay the attorney's fees of all parties,
those he succeeds against, those he loses to and anyone
else "in the action."

Only the Legislature should have

the power to thus expand the effect of a statutory bonding
provision.
It has
notFunding
yetfor digitization
seen fit
so.
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G.
a sham.

The trial on the subcontractor's bond was

Plaintiffs submit that the only reason Defendant

surety required the subcontractors to go through the
lengthy trial was so that they, in concert with surety
and the partnership, could marshal, their forces against
Lignell and Todd and prevail by sheer weight of numbers
and the creation of mass confusion.

To require the elec·

tricians and the drywallers to participate in the trial
against Lignell and Todd apparently was one of the main
elements of surety's trial strategy.

From early in

~e

development of this case, surety took the position that it
had no dispute with the claims made by the different
subcontractors and that any claim they made would not
contested.

~

Defendant surety also admitted, both prior to

and at the time of trial, that the Labor and Material
Payment Bond was binding upon it and valid as to the
subject subcontractors and that it would pay the legitimat
claims of Murray, Comstock, Western Drywall and Claron
Bailey (T. 262, 303).

The fact that there was no serious

contention regarding surety's attitude towards the claims
of the subcontractors was demonstrated throughout the
trial by the conduct of Mr. Nebeker, counsel for
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surety. 6

The recor d c 1 early shows that both Defendants

did little, if any, cross-examination of the subcontractors'
witnesses and called no witnesses in their own behalf.
Even had the surety put up a legitimate defense
to the claims of the subcontractors, the award of attorney's
fees against Lignell and Todd would have been error.

But

based upon the performance of surety, vis-a-vis the subcontractors, there can be no question that the subcontractors' portion of the trial was solely for the benefit of
surety and the Bergs.
That the Plaintiffs should be required by the trial
court to pay for something that was designed and archestrated solely by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland
for its benefit is contrary to justice.
6Nebeker assisted the subcontractors and their
counsel in presenting their claims and offered absolutely
no resistance thereto. On many occasions Mr. Nebeker
lodged objections to questions by counsel for Lignell
and Todd seeking to establish that the workmanship of
the various subcontractors was defective. Particularly,
Mr. Nebeker became actively involved when Mr. Bateman
was attempting to establish, among other things, that
some of the electricians' charges for extras were excessive and that the work had not been done in accordance with the National Electric Code. On various
occasions questions were posep to Mr. Bateman to which
counsel for the electricians did not object, but to
which Mr. Nebeker did object, although the questions
went to the issue of the quality of the work done and
the proper charges therefor, and thus would logically
have been in the best interest of Mr. Nebeker and his
client (T. 935-61 to 935-69; 935-72 to 935-76). On one
occasion Mr. Nebeker even objected to Plaintiffs evidence
that dealt solely with issues between the subcontractors
and the owners and was not related in any way to any
claims against his client (T. 935-66).
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Point IV
THE Al'i'ARD OF INTEREST BY THE TRIAL COURT TO THE
PARTNERSHIP AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AFTER THE JURY VEHDIC!'
WERE RETURNED WAS IMPROPER.

A.

The only issue reserved by the trial court~

attorney's fees.

On July 16, 1976, a pre-trial conferenc,

was held wherein various motions were presented.

All of

the parties to the consolidated case were represented by
their counsel.

One of the issues dealt with at that time

concerned the claims of the surety and the partnership to
an award of attorney's fees.

During the hearing on that

is sue, Mr. Nebeker, counsel for the surety, suggested that
the court ask for briefs on the subject of "attorney's fee
and costs on contractor's bonds."

(Supp. T. 44) .

In resp1

to Mr. Nebeker's suggestion, the court stated:
"It is obvious to the Court maybe some of
this matter will resolve itself at the time of
the trial.
If it's a matter the Court will
have to rule on anyway I'll reserve my ruling
on the motion and anyone that desires to may
present any authorities to support their position."
(Supp. T. 45-47) (emphasis added).
In attempting to clarify the state of the proceed:
Mr. Tanner inquired of the court whether or not that aspe:

of the case was to be tried by the court after the jury
trial

(Supp T. 47).

In response thereto, the following

dialogue took place:
"THE COURT:

I thought that's what we had and thi:
would be the only way to approach it
Hr. Tanner.
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.1-1R · TANNER:

I would too. I do not recall we had
determined that.

THE COURT:

It was mentioned here by Mr. Nebeker
and maybe we hadn't determined it.
Hy ruling contemplated that I had no
intention of permitting that matter
to be presented to the jury.

MR. TANNER:

Thank you, your Honor, I just wanted
to settle that."

THE COURT:

That's the reason I prefaced my remarks by saying that this is a matter
the Court would have to handle at
that time anyway and dependent upon
the outcome of the case it would determine which side would be entitled to
prove any attorney's fees anyway.
That should be reserved as a matter of
law." (Supp. T. 47-48) (emphasis added).

From the above, Plaintiff submits that the record
is clear that the trial court reserved only the issue of
attorney's fees for a determination after the jury verdict.
Further evidence of this fact is clearly disclosed by other
portions of the record.
While discussing the Plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict upon the discovery of the evidence that neither
the joint venture nor the partnership had a proper contractor's license, the court stated that it had gone back
and reviewed its notes of the July 16th hearing and that it
remembered reserving the matter of attorney's fees (T. 1392).
It is important to note that the trial court made no reference at all to the reservation of the issue of interest.
On September 24, 1976, in relation to another motion, the
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court again stated with reference to the pre-trial on JuJ:
16th:
"In connection with your motion earlier in
Chambers talking about the Court having under
advisement a motion to dismiss, that had to do
only with the attorney's fees, did it not?"
(T. 3240) (emphasis added).
The court further stated that the matter of attorney's ~
was left until after the time of trial according to its
notes (T. 3240).

There then ensued a discussion as to ~r

exactly had transpired at that prior hearing in relation t
other subjects and the court declared,
on what the record may say.

""t-~Jell,

I' 11 stand

I think the reporter made a

record and I would be surprised if it's anything different
than I have just read you."7

The discussion

continu~

and the court then stated:
"Can we all agree on this, Mr. Tanner,
that's the only subject matter topic at all
that was reserved until trial was attorney's
fees and had nothing to do about affirmative
defenses or anything of that nature?" (T.
3241) (emphasis added).
At that time, counsel for both the surety and joint ventu:
were present and participated in the discussion.
B.

The Findings of the court relating to inter~

are not supported by the record.

On October 12, 1976, aft

the jury had been dismissed, counsel for surety filed a
notice of a hearing wherein it was indicated for the f~~
7The complete record of that portion of the heart
is found in Supp. Trans. 36-48.
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time that the matter of interest would be determined by the
'court (R. Cl352-1353).

A hearing

was held on that matter

at which time plaintiffs timely raised their objection to
any award of interest by the court (R. Cl389).

The court

erroneously concluded that it had reserved the issue of interest until after trial (R. Cl396) and thereafter, awarded
interest to surety and the partnership and signed Findings
of Fact and a Judgment relating thereto prepared by surety
(R. Cl409-1417).

Plaintiffs submit that the record is

wholly lacking of any mention of the reservation of the
matter of interest until long after the judgments were entered, that the issues deterrninat1ve of

ent~ement

to in-

terest were submitted to the jury, and that the entry of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating thereto
was erroneous and unlawful in light of the record.

As a

consequence, the Findings of Fact must be set aside and the
award of interest based thereon must be reversed.
C.
interest.

The jury considered and rejected an award of
The jury brought in a verdict for the partner-

ship, as if the partnership were the contractor.
clear from the Instructions, the counterclaim

As is

was premised

on the Construction Agreement (Ex. 9) as supplemented
by the Addendum and certain extras.

That agreement pro-

vided for certain conditions to be met before the contractor
was entitled to receive the final 10%.

With the Addendum,

the fixed price contract was for $1,759,003.00.

Ten percent
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--thereof is $175,900.00.

The sum awarded counterclaimant

was $159,801.99, which is less than the amount of the t 1·r.
10%.
The exact wording of the Construction Agreement o:
this point is:
'"rhe final 10% will be disbursed when the
improvements are completed to Pacific Hutual's
satisfaction and are free and clear of liens or
claims which might result in liens. Each disbursement must be evidenced by an architect's
and/or engineer's statement certifying as to
compliance with plans and specifications approved by Pacific Mutual, Uniform Building Co~,
and as to the state of completion of the various
subcontracts, such certificate to be on form
approved or furnished by Pacific Mutual. In
addition, a condition of any disbursement Will
be compliance with all title company or other
requirements imposed so that A.L.T.A. policy of
title insurance rna be issued without exception
to mechanics' and mater~almen' s l~ens. 11
Ex. 9,
p. 3) (emphasis added).
The Plaintiff owners contended that the contractor never:
the condition for its final draw and presented evidence t1
that effect (T. 1672-1676-A).

The testimony was that of

Hr. Ellertson, president of Title Insurance Agency, and
there was no evidence contrary to his testimony adduc.:eil v:
anyone.

He said:
IIQ.

Mr. Ellertson, at the time this closing was

being prepared for, was the Incline Terra7e
project in condition that an A.L.T.A. poll~
of title insurance could be issued by your
firm or its correspondents without exceptlon
to Mechanic's and Material Men Liens?
A.

It was not.

11

(T. 1673, lines 12-17).

-6 4-
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He further testified that the property was not free and clear
of liens and lienable claims at the time of closing (February
1974), and that the closing was only possible because the
owners furnished some $115,000.00 and posted a $42,000.00
bond.

In short, the contractor never met the condition for

payment of the final 10% and the owners did those things
necessary to close and avoid losing the project.

The record

is clear and without dispute that the contractor was not
entitled to its last 10% in February of 1974.

However,

the court ignored this facet of the record, and it became
lost in the complex and confusing maze created by the consolidation of the cases.
Nonetheless, the jury had before it the issue of
the amount of counterclaimant's recovery, including the
issue of whether anything due was due as of February 1974,
or as of the time of their verdict.

Their verdict was for

the exact amount shown by Ex. 252, necessarily implying
that they found the condition precedent to the owners'
e>UI~a-1\c,n for the final 10% had not been met and that in-

terest was not due for the period prior to the verdict.
This is even a stronger case than that which was before
this Court in Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Ut.2d 89, 348 P.2d 931
(1960), where this court held:
"The jury verdict represents the money
owed defendant at the time of the verdict.
Whether the jury included interest in their
verdict cannot be determined but there is
indication that they did consider it because
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it ~as cla~med in plaintiff's complaint, and
thelr verdlct, from the indications in the
record, represents what the defendant owed
the plaintiff at that time."

Point V
THE JUDGMENT OF BERG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPAN!
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE A VALID CONTRACT·
OR'S LICENSE.
Our statutes provide that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
co-partnership, corporation, association or
other organization, or any combination of any
thereof, to engage in the business or act in
the capacity of contractor within this state
without having a license therefor . . . "
§58-23-l.
It is uncontroverted that the contracting party, the join!
venture, did not have a valid contractor's license issued
by the State of Utah and, in fact, had never made an appl:
cation for such a license (T. 3048).8

Although the tril

court refused to allow plaintiffs to present evidence of
lack of license to the jury, the evidence

established~

trial, outside the presence of the jury, showed that the
partnership, Berg Brothers Construction Company, also was
not licensed at any time relevant to this cause (T. 3045·
8 An individual license was issued by the Depar~
of Contractors to Berg Construction Company but this. was 1
name under which the individual, Frank Berg, did buslnes:·
That license was first issued in 1940 (T. 3050). This, 1
ever, is not the equivalent of a license to the joint vent
which also did business under the name of Berg Constructll
Company (T. 3048, 3068).
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3047, 3049) and the trial court so found (T. 1688).

As a

result, neither the partnership, nor the joint venture
would be entitled to recover under the laws of this state.
Meridian Corporation v. !1cGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d 1110
(Utah 1977).
The uncontroverted evidence in this matter shows
that prior to trial, Plaintiffs' attorneys made inquiries
to the Department of Contractors concerning the existence of
contractor's licenses for Mr. Clifford Berg, for Berg Brothers Construction Company and for Berg Construction Company.
They were informed that Berg Brothers Construction Company
was properly licensed and that the license had originally
been issued in 1969; but that the files were out of their
place and unavailable for examination (R. C992-999, 13651369).

As the trial drew near, Plaintiffs' counsel made

additional attempts to verify the status of the contractor's
license, but were prevented from doing so either by the
actions of employees of the Department of Business Regulation, Contractors Division, or by the absence of the files
relating thereto from their normal place in that Department
(R. C992-994).

On September 1, 1976, Plaintiffs finally

gained access to the records of the Department and ascertained at that time that there was, in fact, no contractor's
license in existence at the times critical to this suit.
Plaintiffs thereupon immediately notified opposing counsel
and moved for a directed verdict based on this lack of
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licensing.

This was done between the first and the se cone

days of the trial of the owners' suit against the contract
and after the close of the electricians' case in chief.
Mr.

Robert Frome, director of the Contractors Divi

sian, testified that his records indicated that the part•
ship, Berg Brothers Construction Company, was originally
licensed on December 11, 1969, but that its license lapsed
on April 30, 1971.

Thereafter, the partnership was unli·

censed throughout the remainder of 1971, all of 1972 and
1973.

Mr. Frome testified that a license was issued in Ju.

1974 but was different from the one that had previously be
issued to the partnership; it contained a different

n~r

had a different bid limit and was a Class "B-1, labor onl1
license, while the original license had been a Class "B"
license.
It was uncontroverted that the partnership neither
alleged in any of its pleadings that it was, in fact, pro;
erly licensed, nor sought to cure that defect by amendment
(T. 1390).

Further, it is uncontroverted that as a resul:

of the partnership's failure to plead a license, Plaintifi
as their first defense in their Reply to the Counterclaim,
alleged that the counterclaim failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted (R. C962-964,
R. A38-40).

Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that

"lack of license" is an affirmative defense under Rule B[l
and that Plaintiffs' failure to so plead before trial ~r
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stituted a waiver under Rule 12(h)
1396).

(T. 1687, R. Cl395-

This is error requiring a reversal of counterclaim-

ant's judgment.
A.

A contractor must prove, as an element of his

prima facie case, that he held a valid Utah Contractor's
license when he entered into the construction contract.
It is the clear law of this state that the failure to obtain
a license which is required by a statute enacted for the
safety and protection of the citizens of the state is fatal
to a claim for affirmative relief in our courts.

Meridian

Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra; Mosley v. Johnson, 22
Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969); Lyman v. Taylor, 14 Utah
2d 362, 384 P.2d 407 (1963); Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Utah 521,
P.2d 849 (1949); Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733
(1948); Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co., 102
Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951

(1942).

This rule.of law was

reaffirmed by this Court on July 29th of this year.

Meridian

Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra.
There is no doubt that the license required by Section 58-23-1 is for the protection of the citizens of the
State of utah (Meridian v. McGlynn/Garrnaker Co., supra;
Olsen v. Reese, supra), and that the partnership was required
to have such a license.
B.

The trial court improperly placed upon the owners

the burden of ascertaining the existence or non-existence of
the required license.

Although the established rule in this
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state is that in order for a contractor to recover upona
contract it is necessary for him, as part of his case ~
chief, to allege and prove that he was a licensed contract
at the time the contract was entered into, Meridian Corp,
v. HcGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra; Olsen v. Reese, supra; Ek·
lund v. Elwell, supra, the trial court took the position
that the contractor had no duty to even allege, let
prove, the existence of a valid license, rather that

alo~
t~

burden was upon the owners to negate that proposition. TL
precise position, however, was rejected by this Court as
early as 1942 in the case of Smith v. American Packing anc
Provision Co., supra.

Therein this Court stated:

"Appellant contends that all of the matters
raised by defendant constitute matters of defense which plaintiff does not have to negative.
However, the general rule is that where a person
seeks recovery for professional services for
which a license is required as a condition precedent to the rendition of such services for a
fee, such person must allege and prove facts,
which show he was licensed at the time such
services were performed or that he was exempted
from the class required to have such license
. . . The facts as to license and qualifications for performing professional services are
almost without exception better known to the
person holdincr such a license than to the other
party.
It might be extremely difficult for a
person defending an action based on alleged
professional services to negative the existence
of a license or show that claimant does not
come within the exceptions of the statute."
(emphasis added) .
The very problems envisioned by this Court in the
Smith case were, in fact, realized in the instant case.
facts as to the existence or non-existence of the require;
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license were clearly better known to the partnership.

In

fact, Mr. Berg knew as early as July 24, 1974, that Berg
Brothers Construction Company had not been properly licensed
during the period in question (Ex. 242).

Nevertheless, that

unlicensed partnership proceeded to file the Counterclaim
in the instant action, omitting therefrom, either intentionally or unintentionally, an allegation that it was properly licensed as required by law (R. A21-27, T. 1390).

As

set forth in the affidavits of counsel for Plaintiffs, a
diligent effort was made on Plaintiffs' behalf to determine
whether or not Berg Brothers Construction Company was indeed
properly licensed but in spite of this effort, they were
unable to verify that Berg Brothers Construction Company
was in fact not licensed until after the consolidated trial
had commenced.

In spite of the fact that Plaintiffs were

prevented from obtaining the necessary information, and
further in spite of the fact that Berg, the managing partner
of the partnership, had known for over two years that the
partnership had no license, the trial court erroneously
placed upon the owners the burden of proving the non-existence
of the contractor's license.
Although, in Plaintiffs' view, the case of Smith v.
American Packing and Provision is clear, if any doubt remained as to who had the burden of proof regarding licensing,
that matter was disposed of in 1949 in the case of Eklund v.
Elwell, supra.

In that case, a contractor was denied
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recovery on his contract because he was not properly licen.
In a concurring opinion Justice Wolfe stated, at page 840 :
"I concur in the results.
I have had a
lingering doubt as to the correctness of our
holding that a plaintiff in a licensed business is required to plead that at the time
of the making of the contract, he was licensed
to do the business in pursuance of which the
contract was made.
Each time the question
comes up there is renewed in my mind the question of whether it should not be pleaded as a
defense, but I bow to the law already laid
down in that respect in this jurisdiction."
(emphasis added)
This Court has recently again affirmed the proposi
set forth in Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co. t
it is necessary for a party seeking to recover where a lie
is required to allege that he had the license in order to
state a cause of action.
Co., supra.

Meridian Corp. v McGlynn/Garrnake:

Thus, for the trial court to shift this burdf

to the owners was clearly an error.

Since the record esta

lishes beyond question that neither the partnership nortl
joint venture was licensed, the proper remedy is to rever:
the judgment on the counterclaim.
C.

The trial court erred in refusing to admit e~

ence that the counterclaimant had no contractor 1 s licen2!.·
After shifting to Plaintiffs the burden of disproving the
existence of the contractor 1 s license, the court then rul<
that Plaintiffs had waived the right to raise that defense
under Rule 8 (c), U.R.C.P., and refused to allow Plaintiffs
to present any evidence to the jury on that point.

Rule!

enumerates 19 affirmative defenses which must be alleged·
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One of those enumerated defenses is "license".

The court

erroneously concluded that the use of the term "license"
meant that the owners had to prove "lack of license".

It

is submitted, however, that the term "license" is not synonymous with the term "1 ack of 1 icense" .

9

In the first instance "license", if it had anything
at all to do with such things as a contractor's license,
would normally be interpreted to mean that the proponent of
the proposition must establish that he had a license.

The

only occasions when having a "license" would constitute a
defense would be in an administrative or court procedure
alleging that a contractor lacked a license or is practicing
without a license.

In such cases "license" would be a de-

fense.
In a case based upon a construction contract--or
for a broker's fee or attaney's fee or medical fee, etc.,
the defense to the claim that money is due would be "lack
of license".

"License" is not a defense at all, let alone

an affirmative defense in cases involving regulated occupations requiring licensing under the state law.
The use of the defense "license" had its derivation
as a defense or plea of justification to an action in trespass,

Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., "license" P·

1068,

and, as used in Rule 8(c), is synonymous with "consent".

Cone v. Iverson, 4 ~~- 203, 35 P.2d 1933 (1893). The defense
9 Plaintiffs submit that Rule 8(c) simila7lY do~s ~ot
require a party to plead "lack of accord and sat~sfact~on ,
"lack
of duress", "lack of waiver", etc.
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of license appears in actions for trespass, Raser v. QualL
4 Blackf. 286

(Ind. 1837); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 llB:

Shiffman v. Hickey, 101 Or. 596,
Cone v. Iverson, supra.

200 P. 1035 (1921); and conve:

In each of the cited cases, plain·

tiff complained of an act on the part of defendant, and de·
fendant answered by admitting that although he had done the
act complained of it was done with the "license" or "conse:
of plaintiff.

As used in Rule 8 (c), "license" does not meo

a physical document but, rather, refers to the prior appro·.
to do some act; therefore, that term is not synonymous wit:
"lack of license" as applied by the trial court.
By construing the term "license" to include the ter
"lack of license", the trial court required

Plaintiffs~

assume a portion of the partnership's affirmative case and
shifted the burden on that issue to plaintiffs, which is
contrary to the law of this state,

Meridian Corp. v. MeG!;

Garmaker Co. , supra; Smith v. American Packing and Provisi:
Co., supra, and contrary to the provision, purpose and sec:
of the rules of procedure.
The court went even further in reallocating burden
of pleading and proof.

In the instant case the sole con·

tractor defendant, the joint venture, had not even countet
claimed.

No one but the defendant may counterclaim.

None·

theless, despite the fact that the defendant joint venturi
had made no claim of any kind, the trial court held that
Plaintiffs were required under Rule 8 (c) to allege as an
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affirmative defense that one of the constituent parties to
the joint venture lacked a license (T. 2565) , and further
held that Plaintiffs' failure to so allege prior to trial
barred them forever from showing that the interloping joint
venturer was unlicensed.

The court did not elaborate on

the procedures that Plaintiffs should have employed, but one
must assume that the trial court was of the opinion that
Plaintiffs should either have included this "affirmative
defense" in their Complaint, or should, at the time the
non-defendant volunteered to interpose a claim, have filed
some additional pleading wherein the "affirmative defense"
was set forth.
D.

The trial court erroneously concluded that the

1950 adoption of the Rules of Procedure shifted the licensing burden to Plaintiffs.

The trial court was of the erron-

eous opinion that the duty to allege and prove the existence
of a contractor's license was procedural, rather than substantive, and that it had been changed by the adoption of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950.
not the case.

This clearly is

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted

by this Court pursuant to the authority given to it by Section 78-2-4.

Therein it is provided that this Court

has the power to prescribe, alter and revise the rules of
practice and procedure in all civil actions.

That statute,

however, has a clearly stated limitation of particular significance to this case.

It provides that such rules "may
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not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of ,
a,,

litigant. nlO
There can be little doubt that the rules deterrn~~
the elements needed to constitute a cause of action are 5 ~
stanti ve in nature.

As has been stated, "the elements of

plaintiff's prima facie case are determined by applicable
substantive law," 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice, ,18.27[4],
p. 1858.
"It is a matter of substantive law whether certain
elements do or do not constitute a part of the plaintiffs'
prima facie case." 2A J. Moore, supra, ,18.27(2], p. 1843.
See also, U.S. For the Use and Benefit of Greenville Equip·
ment Co. v. U.S. Cas. Co., 278 F. Supp. 653 (D. Del. 1962).
There can be no doubt that under the clear mandate
of our Legislature, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure did
not change the components of any cause of action known to
the law at the time the rules were adopted.

What was a ne1

sary element in order to recover under code pleading is st:
a necessary element under notice pleading.

Cf. Meridian

C:

v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra.
Of special interest on this subject is the caseof
Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard, 231 Ga. 26, 190 S.E. 2d
10 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopte:
pursuant to a similar mandate; Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sectior.
2072 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ar:
to regulate only "practice and procedure" and are not to
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
see ,
Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Mississi~
Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
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899 (1973), decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia after
the adoption by it of their Rules of Practice which are comparable to our Rules of Civil Procedure.ll

In that case,

the Supreme Court of Georgia was faced with a situation
similar to the one presented here.

An

unlicensed employment

agency was attempting to recover a fee in the face of a
regulatory statute requiring a license.

The courts

of Georgia had long ago determined, as this Court has, that
proof of a valid, regulatory license was a prerequisite to
recovery for such a claim.

The issue presented was, as here,

the effect of the adoption of the rules of procedure upon
the established substantive law of the state.

The court

there resolved the precise issue here in question when it
held that "lack of license" was not a defense that must be
raised by the opposing party.

This holding was under the

very language that the trial court in the instant case was
required to interpret when it held that Plaintiffs had the
burden under Rule 8(c) of pleading and proving "lack of
license" as an affirmative defense.

The Georgia court spec-

11

Georgia in 1966 enacted the Civil Procedures Act,
which is comparable to both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 81A-108(c)
of that Act deals with affirmative defenses and is almost
identical to our Rule S(c). It states:
"Affirmative defenses - In a pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party ~hall ~et fort~
affirmatively accord and sat~sfact~on, arb~tra
tion and award, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, il~
legality injury by fellow servant, laches, 1~
cense, p~yment, release, res judicata, st~tute
of frauds, statute of limitations, and wa~ver . .
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ifically held that adopting the rules of procedure did not
alter the substantive burden of proving a valid license as
part of the case in chief, precisely the position reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court of Utah in Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn;
Garmaker Co., supra.
E.

The counterclaimant's action should have been

dismissed for failure to plead or prove that it was a licen1
contractor.

Since the partnership's counterclaim must be

vested with all the prerequisites of a complaint, State by
and Through Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65,
585

.3~$

f.i

f£~

(1962), the partnership's failure to state a prima

cause obviated the necessity of defendant pleading any affi:
mative defense.

Indeed, an affirmative defense only goes

to those facts which the plaintiff, or in this case the
counterclaimant, is not bound to prove.

West Nichols Hills

Presbyterian Church v. Folks, 276 P.2d 255

(Okla. 1954). ili

stating it differently, evidence which contrqverts facts
necessary. to be proven by the plaintiff need not be pleaded
by way of affirmative defense but may be shown under a gen·
eral denial.
(1959).

Elston v. Wagner, 216 Or. 386, 337 P.2d 326

This Lignell and Todd did in the instant case~

alleging that the Counterclaim failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted (R. A38-40).

~en

the licensing issue was raised by Plaintiffs on a motion tc
dismiss the Counterclaim, that motion should have been grar.:
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F.

The matter of lack of a valid contractor's license

may be raised at any time in a proceeding in which an unlicensed contractor seeks to recover for construction work.
As set forth above the law in Utah is clear that a contractor
must plead the existence of a license in order to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
McGlynn/Garmaker Co., supra.

Meridian Corp. v.

Under the wording of Rule 12,

the defense of failure to state a claim can be raised at any
time.

Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P., provides that a party waives all

defenses and objections which he does not present either by
motion or in his answer or reply except failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, which defense can be
raised by a later pleading, by a motion for judgment on the
pleadings or at the trial on the merits.

It is clear that

plaintiffs raised the matter of the failure to state a claim
"at the trial on the merits" as soon as the fact became
known to them that the partnership was not properly licensed
(T. 1373-1377).

This was clearly permissible under the ex-

press terms of Rule 12.

As has been stated:

"Rule 12(b) (2) provides that a defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted . . . may be made in any pleading
permitted or ordered under Rule 7(~) or by
motion for judgment upon the plead~ngs or at
the trial on the merits. Hence, these substantial defenses are expressly preserved again~t
waiver under Rule 12(h) (1) or by the operat~on
of Rule 12(g)." 5 Cyc. Fed. Pro. §1547, p.
53 (emphasis added).
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•
A party may move to dismiss the Complaint after filing his
answer where the right to make such a motion ...;s reserved
incorporated in the answer.
p. 48.

5 eye. Fed. Proc. , supra, SlS:.

Plaintiffs in the instant case made such a resem

tion in their Reply to the partnership 1 s counterclaims
40).

01

(R •.:.

Plaintiffs promptly moved the trial court during the

trial to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of license once
that ir.formation was known to them.
taken.

That motion was well

As the court in the Management Search case stated:
"At whatever stage of the proceedings it
appears that the plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a contract to be permitted to be
entered into only by persons holding licenses
issued as a regulatory measure, it becomes
imperative for the plaintiff to prove they
hold such a license and held such a license
at the time the contract was entered into in
order to authorize a recovery." Jid. ab 90l·9C'-·

Thus, once the issue of lack of license came into focus it
was incumbent upon the partnership to prove the existence 1
the required license.
G.

This it failed to do.

Even if lack of license were an affirmative de·

fense Plaintiffs should have been allowed to raise that rna:
by motion under the circumstances of this case.

Even ife

Court should determine that the term "license" as used in
Rule 8 (c) placed upon Plaintiffs the burden of raising tha:
matter by way of an affirmative defense. Plaintiffs

1

motio:

to dismiss, nevertheless, should have been granted.
An affirmative defense, even though not pleaded,~

be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6).
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As

Professor Hoare has stated in his treatise:
"Rule 8(c) may seem to imply that affirmative defenses may be raised only by a pleading
(where one is required or permitted) and not
otherwise. This, however, is too na~row of a
construction of that Rule. A defendant may move
for summary judgment under Rule 56 where there
is 'no genuine issue as to any fact' and he
'is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law'·
it is clear that summary judgment is proper
'
where the defendant shows the existence of an
affirmative defense even though he has filed
no answer. Under the 1946 amendment to Rule
12(e), it is also made clear that a defendant
may raise an affirmative defense by motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim; that the
Court may treat such a motion as a motion for
summary judgment • . . By analogizing the motion
to a motion for summary judgment, however, the
amended Rule 12(b) clearly permits affirmative
defenses to be raised by motion. The affirmative defense raised by motion may be handled
solely under Rule 12(b), without resort to
summary judgment procedure, where the defense
appears on the face of the complaint itself.
And by authorizing the motion under Rule 12(b)
to be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56, amended Rule 12(b) clearly permits an
affirmative defense based on matters outside
the complaint to be raised by motion." 2A J.
Moore, supra, ,,8.28, p. 1863-64.
Further, Professor Moore states:
"Affirmative defenses may be raised on a
motion for summary judgment even though not
pleaded." 6A J. Moore, supra, ,156.17[5], .
p. 735-741. "There 1s, therefore, no quest1on
that affirmative defenses may be presented by
a motion for summary judgment." 2A J. r-toore,
supra, ~12.09, p. 2295.
The pleadings in this case clearly indicate that on every
occasion Plaintiffs preserved their right to challenge the
sufficiency of the partnership's case by alleging that the
counterclaims failed to state a cause of action.
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Pursuant to our Rules and the authorities above cit,
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be
raised at any time in the proceedings and cannot be waivd
e,
When coupled with affidavits dealing with matters outside t
pleadings such a motion is to be treated as one for sununary
judgment.

Plaintiffs were, therefore, free to raise their

motion at anytime.
Plaintiffs raised the motion of failure to statea
claim immediately upon obtaining the factual information
supporting their motion.

Plaintiffs

1

motion was supported

by affidavits that were accepted by the court; therefore, i·
became a motion for summary judgment under the Rules.
tiffs

1

Plai

motion should have been granted because the uncontrc·

verted facts showed that the partnership was not entitled
to recover due to its lack of license.
H.

The trial court erroneously precluded the Plair:

tiffs' affirmative defense of lack of license.

On July 9,

1976, the partnership served on Plaintiffs an Amended Answe
and Counterclaim (R. C827-832).

The Amended Answer and

Counterclaim reiterated their defenses to three causes of
action pled by Plaintiffs, raised the new issue of entitle·
ment to attorney 1 s fees and, in addition thereto, stated,
"Defendants incorporate herein all affirmative defenses,
cross-claims and counterclaims which have previously been
alleged against the plaintiffs Lignell and Todd."

Plainti'

immediately moved for a dismissal of that portion of the
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counterclaim relating to attorney's fees but did not file
a reply responding to the other allegations of the counterclaim.

The trial court, on July 16, 1976, took the motion

under advisement.
Although they felt that the trial court's views
regarding the requirement of alleging lack of license as
an affirmative defense were in error, Plaintiffs, in addition to filing a written Motion for Summary Judgment, also
filed a Reply to the last Amended Counterclaim of the partnership setting forth therein as an affirmative defense
the failure of the partnership to be properly licensed under
the laws of this state (R. C962-964).

The Court permitted

the reply to be filed (T. 1687), but some 11 days later
ordered, on its own motion, that the affirmative defense
relating to lack of license set forth in that Reply be stricken
(T. 2557).

Plaintiffs submit that this clearly was an error

since there was no motion made by any party to strike any
portion of Plaintiffs' Reply.

See Rule 12(f), U.R.C.P.

In addition, at the time the Reply was filed, the partnership was some two weeks away from commencing the presentation of their evidence relating to the Counterclaims.

The

Reply did nothing to change Plaintiffs' theory of its case
in chief and it did nothing to impact the cases of the subcontractors that had previously been concluded in the earlier
phase of the consolidated matter.

Plaintiffs submit

that they had an absolute right under Rule 7 to file the

-83-
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Reply and that in addition thereto, the court permitted tr
Reply to be filed without qualification.

Absent a motion

from some other party, the trial court could not thereafte:
properly strike a portion of that responsive pleading.
I.

Plaintiffs should have been permitted, as a

minimum, to amend their pleadings.

Even had plaintiffs sc.

to amend rather than file an original pleading, such an
amendment would have been proper.

Under Rule 15, U.R.C.P ..

amendments to pleadings are to be freely granted when jus·
tice so .requires.

Rule 15 (b) provides that when issues no:

raised by the pleadings are tried by the parties they shou:
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised

~e

pleadings.

This Court, in Chaney v. Rooker, 4 Utah 2d 201.

381 P.2d 86

(1963), has indicated clearly that it favors

liberal amendments to the pleadings so that all the partie:
are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimat
contentions may pertain to their dispute.

In the insta~

case, however, Plaintiffs were prevented from doing that

t:

the trial court.
The court 1 s failure to allow the Plaintiffs to rai:
the issue of lack of license under all the facts and eire~
stances of this case was clearly prejudicial and, in Plain·
tiff 1 s view, constituted reversible error for the reasons
forth above.
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Point VI
CONSOLIDATING THE ACTIONS FOR TRIAL MADE THE ISSUES
AND THE EXHIBITS SO NUMEROUS AND COMPLEX, AND THE TRIAL SO
LONG AND COMPLICATED AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE OWNERS OF
A FAIR TRIAL OF THEIR CLAIM AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR AND SURETY.
On January 15, 1975, upon a motion by the partnership
and the surety, the Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. consolidated all three cases for the purpose of trial.

This was

done over the objections of Plaintiffs and the drywallers.
The result was a trial that was inordinately long, unnecessarily
complex, burdened with many issues that could not be adequately
dealt with in the context of the consolidated proceedings, and
caused, in Plaintiffs' view, total confusion on the part of
the jury, resulting in its inability to adequately review the
evidence, make the necessary distinctions and render a just
verdict.
Any one of the three cases would, by itself, have constituted a full and major effort on the part of counsel if it
were done properly.

But the combination of the three, as the
12
size of the record and the number of exhibits reflects,
created a situation that was totally unmanageable and substantially impaired Plaintiffs' rights to a fair trial in their
12 Two Hundred and Sixty Three exhibits were marked;
some contained as many as 60 separate parts. The transcript
is over 3500 pages long.
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claim against the contractor and the surety.
A.

The different issues and contractual standards

between the parties made consolidation improper.

Consolida·

is not proper where the parties, the court and the jury are
burdened with an overcomplication of issues and instruction:
Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570

(3d Cir. 1961), or where it'.

result in prejudice to any party.
16 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

United States v. Lusti~,

That there was an enormous

complication of issues and complex and voluminous instructi:
in the consolidated case cannot be denied (R. Cl039-1109),
Plaintiffs claim that consolidation was highly

prejudici~t

them.
Claron Bailey, the materialman, maintained in his
action

that Lignell had acted fraudulently toward him; tie

jury found in Lignell's favor on that issue.

There was no:

issue between the owners and the contractor and surety. In
the same vein, the electricians, in their lawsuit, claimed
that Lignell had made certain oral statements to them which
Lignell vehemently denied, and again the jury found for Lig·
nell.

These issues were totally unrelated to the Plaintiff:

claims and no such allegations could have been argued or
presented to the jury except through the device of combininr
the actions.

Obviously, such claims tend to prejudice the

jury and weigh heavily on the matter of credibility.

Plair·

tiffs, in their suit against the contractor and surety, sho
not have been required to deal with the intemperate and
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accusing remarks of counsel for the subcontractors while the
jury was weighing the heavy and complex accounting and contract
issues.

The claims challenging Lignell's integrity were pri-

marily a device to permit irrelevant and besmirching testimony
to be used to improperly appeal to prejudice and sway the jury.
In short, the tactic was to smear Lignell and broaden the
impact by the device of consolidating with the owners' suit
cases containing unfounded, but derogatory allegations, not
otherwise admissible.

This is prejudicial and should warrant

a new trial free of such improprieties.
In the consolidated trial, all of the other parties
combined against the owners, even to the extent that counsel
for the bonding company and counsel for the contractor assisted
the drywaller and electricians, alleged that

thei~

claims were

just and helped them maximize the dollar amounts awarded them.
Thus, Plaintiffs found themselves in the difficult and unenviable position of having to

o-tt

point~to

the jury that many

of the claims for extras by the subcontractors were not legitimate while Berg acquiesced to duplicate charges and shoddy
work.

The tactics employed by Defendants and the subcontract-

ors allowed them to obscure the differences between the standards and requirements of the construction contract (BX. 9)
and the standards, or lack thereof, in the agreements between
the contractor and the subcontractors, as previously set forth
in Point

r.

Thus, the jury was given the impossible task of

recognizing and applying at least two different contract
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standards to the testimony and to the exhibits, and segreg,
in the mass of detail those charges of the subcontractors:
were the owners

1

responsibility from those which were the c

1

tractor s responsibility, although the exhibits were whol!;
lacking in the detail necessary to permit the
dards to be applied.

Had the cases not been

differings~
consolidat~t

differing standards would not have been present.
Permitting the intermingling of the evidence was prej(·
dicial error, and was the direct result of the conso.idatic
thus, consolidation was improper, Bascom Launder Corp. v.
coin Corp., 15 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United

1·

Stat~t

Lustig, supra, particularly in view of the fact that the tr.
were to a jury and there were different issues and differeJ:
contracts controlling the legal consequences of the
cases.

var~w

Cf. Holbert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 14 F.R.D. 148('

Penn. 1953).
B.

The consolidated trial resulted in confusion.

~·

end of such a lengthy trial the jury had such a mass of eVl'
dence before it, some presented early in the trial and invc
other issues, that it could not reasonably be expected tot:
it all straight.
As early as August 19th, the fourth day of the trial,
the court, after listening to the testimony concerning the
voluminous change orders submitted by Comstock, and Mr • co:
stock 1 s acknowledgement that many of them were duplicates,
stated that although he thought he wasn 1 t going to get con·
fused, he was "running into a problem." (T. 374}.
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Mr. com:

the author of many of the change orders, also testified that,
although he had a good memory, he was having trouble keeping
the various exhibits separate (T. 420) and further stated that
he was totally confused, and that his

~ind

could only handle

"so many" (T. 424).
Plaintiffs submit that if a distinguished juror, who had
the benefit of many years of trial experience

and the author

of many of the documents were both confused, then a jury of
laymen , without the benefit of notes or of previous instructions concerning what they were to look for in the evidence,
must also have been totally and hopelessly lost at that point.
Plaintiffs submit that this perplexed and uncomprehending condition continued throughout the remainder of the trial and was
a direct result of the erroneous consolidation and intentional
tactics of the parties who had fostered the confusion.

c.

Consolidation resulted in the admission of much evi-

dence that should properly have been excluded.

Because of the

consolidation of the cases, there are many instances where the
evidence was objected to and inadmissible as to the Plaintiffs,
but properly admissible under the issues among the other parties or in the other cases.

Although the court repeatedly

cautioned the jury respecting that matter (T. 93, 264), Plaintiffs submit that such cautioning did not cure the prejudicial
effects of the admission of the evidence.

Examples are the

testimony on the abortive fraud and misrepresentation claims,
and testimony impacted by the differing contract standards·
Hhile there are numerous other examples in the record
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1.

The surety was allowed, over Plaintiffs'

objections, to present to the jury evidence that the brothe·
Berg had signed an indemnity agreement with the surety and
that any judgment that was rendered against the surety wou)(
be passed through to them.

In order to hammer that point

home, counsel for surety was even allowed to read the indem·
nity provision to the jury!

All this, despite the fact that

there was no dispute between the surety and the Berg:;,concerr
ing the validity of the documents or the authenticity of th1
signatures, and despite the fact that such testimony hadM
relevance to Plaintiffs' claim against surety.
This type of testimony was clearly improper and pre:
dicial to Plaintiffs.
the jury's sympathy.

It had only one real

purpose--~,

Surety wanted the jury to clearly und1

stand that if it awarded any money to the owners,

payment~

come not from company funds but from the "poor" individuals.
This is the converse of the "insurance policy" argument tha:
is universally rejected by the courts, i.e., "it's not the
individual but the 'rich' insurance company that will end u:
paying the judgment."
The trial court excluded that evidence with respect
to Plaintiffs (T. 3184), but it is submitted that such cos~
surgery was wholly ineffectual in removing that information
from the minds of the jury as they weighed the issues.
2.

Although the contractor refused to claim

that the drywall work was defective, the drywallers, nevert
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less, presented evidence regarding the quality of the work
done during the third phase of the suit, i.e., the owners vs.
the contractor and surety.

An objection was timely made to

that evidence on behalf of the owners which was sustained by
the trial court (T. 2266, 2269-2270).

The evidence was ad-

mitted, however, for the limited purpose of resolving any
disputes between the drywallers and the contractor relating
to drywall quality.

Between those parties, however, there

were no such disputes.

The contractor and surety both readily

admitted that the sum requested by the drywaller was due from
them.

Thus, the testimony coming as it did long after the

drywall phase of the consolidated cases had been concluded,
without opposition, could only have had one purpose -- to dispute the testimony of the owners' witnesses that the smelly
apartment and wavy walls failed to meet the contractor's standard of performance, work "free from faults and defects."
But as to the owners, that testimony was excluded, and could
not be considered by the jury for that purpose.

The result

was that the Plaintiffs were again finessed by the consolidation.

The record is clear and unchallenged that as between

the contractor and the owners the drywall did not meet the
contract standard but the jury heard some evidence that as
between the contractor and the subcontractor the work was
acceptable -- a fleeting and transitory distinction shortly
merged into a general impression.
Thus, the consolidation placed upon the jury the diffSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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icult and, in Plaintiffs' view, impossible task of segregat
the testimony applicable to only some of the parties from t
admissible only as to others.

Bascom Launder Corp. v. Tele·

coin Corp., supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs 5 ~
mit that the jury could not distinguish between those items
that were admissible for only a limited purpose and those t
were not, and exclude from their deliberations that evidenci
that may have been admitted as to one party but not as to
Plaintiffs.

See Hays v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 35 1

234 (E.D. Penn. 1964).

Thus, Plaintiffs' case could

not~

properly evaluated by the jury; the "excluded" testimony nei
sarily having permeated their deliberations.
D.
problems.

Consolidation created insurmountable practical
Because of the plethora of issues in the separat1

cases, Plaintiffs were required to devote a considerable
amount of time to each of the claims responding in turn to
all four sets of opposing counsel, both during the trial ani
in oral argument.

Thus, although the court allowed liberal

time for making closing arguments, etc., the number of issul
in the combined suits limited the time and diffused the at~
tion that Plaintiffs could give to each.
There can be no doubt that consolidation, with its
attendant multiplication, confusion and obfuscation of the
issues, and the inclusion of otherwise inadmissible and int:
matory accusations against the owners, was the deliberate
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trial strategy of the surety and the partnership.

Prior to

trial, counsel for surety freely acknowledged that his client,
the contractor and the subcontractorshad all "banded together"
against the owners (Supp. T. 15).
If any doubt exists that the so-called "claims and
controversies" between the subcontractors and the surety and
contractor were a charade, one need only review the record of
this case.

Neither surety nor the contractor offered any re-

sistance to the subcontractors' claims.
them was minimal or non-existent.

Cross-examination by

No witnesses were called

by the surety or contractor to rebut the subcontractors' cases
in chief.

No motions were made by surety or the contractor

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
subcontractors.

As previously pointed out in Point I, both

the contractor and surety freely admitted that the money was
due and actually assisted the subcontractors in presenting
their cases.
The combination of the parties against Plaintiffs allowed the subcontractors, the partnership and the surety to collaborate together and divide up areas of responsibility.

It

allowed four "separate" parties to cross-examine and recrossexamine any witnesses of Plaintiffs, and to remain unanimously,
approvingly and, to the jury, impressively silent when a witness of any of them was challenged by Plaintiffs.

Thus, much

of the testimony adverse to Plaintiffs was repeated to the jury
over and over again, while favorable testimony was effectively
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buried.

Four voices were often raised in support of, or

against, a particular matter, as opposed to one on the oppc
side.

This numerical disparity, in Plaintiffs' view, encot

aged the jury to "get on the bandwagon" and had an unfair
influence on their determinations.
When the trial concluded, the jury had only the dire
memory of what had been said earlier and how it impacted th:
issues of the various cases.

In Plaintiffs' view that was:

significant factor in causing the jury to render its genera.
verdict, and pick the ultimate figure off the Defendants' e1
hibits

(see Ex. 252), without making the distinctions that

Plaintiffs have heretofore outlined, without giving Plainti!
credit for admittedly defective work, and without giving PL
tiffs' claims the careful consideration to which they

~R

entitled and which they would have received had the separat:
suits not been lumped into one mass before the jury.
E.
rights.

Consolidation abridged Plaintiffs' substantive

Plaintiffs were further prejudiced by consolidatk

because they were precluded, as a result thereof, from rais
the issue of the lack of contractor's license on the part c
partnership and the joint venture.

The court indicated tha·

one of the motivating factors in its denial of Plain tiffs'
Motion for a Summary Judgment on that issue was the fact tr.
the subcontractors had already presented their claims to~
court (T. 1686-1687; R. Cl396).

This, however, should ~ft

and would have had no effect on Plaintiffs' separate claims
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but for consolidation.

Thus, substantive rights of Plaintiffs

were abridged solely because of the fact that the cases had
been consolidated for purposes of trial.
By its own admission, the court did not evaluate Plaintiffs' motion wholly upon its merits, but based its decision
upon the impact a ruling in Plaintiffs' favor would have on
other portions of the consolidated case that were wholly extraneous to Plaintiffs.
As mentioned previously in Point VI, the erroneous
imposition of attorney's fees upon Plaintiffs, which was a
direct result of the consolidation, also constituted an abridgement of Plaintiffs' substantive rights.
F.

Consolidation caused prejudicial evidence rulings

and prejudicial and improper Findings to be entered.

The

court, in Plaintiffs' view, committed numerous evidentiary
errors throughout the course of the trial.

This is not to be

unduly critical of the trial court, but is another evidence
of the confusion and difficulty occasioned by the consolidation
of the three cases for purposes of trial.

The two most

egregious such rulings have previously been dealt with in
Point I, but one additional item requires mention.
Three months after the rendition of the jury verdict,
and after the hearing on attorney's fees, the court allowed
counsel for surety to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

The Findings proposed and adopted went far beyond the

evidence in the attorney's fee hearing and dealt with issues
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and facts that were solely within the province of the j~y
(R. Cl409-1419).
Court.

Such Findings should be ignored by this

There is absolutely no indication anywhere that the

jury, in reaching any of its verdicts, made the Findings
respecting fault or breach of contract signed by the court,
Plaintiffs submit that there is no provision under Rule 52,
U.R.C.P. authorizing the court to speculate concerning the
rationale of a jury verdict through the entry of the Findinc
of Fact dealing with issues determinable solely by that bod!
Such Findings should be set aside by this Court as being im·
proper under Rule 52.
The arguments presented in this Point VI either in·
dividually or in combination show, in Plaintiffs' view, that
the consolidation resulted in substantial prejudice to Plair.
tiffs.

As such, reversible error was committed.

Atkinson

v. Roth, supra; United States v. Knauer, 149 F. 2d 519 (7th
Cir. 1945).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the errors com·
plained of require either a complete reversal of the judgmer
on the counterclaims of the partnership and the surety or,
at a minimum, a remand for a new trial without consolidatior
If this Court concurs that an unlicensed contractor
may not recover under a construction contract or that one
member of a joint venture may not recover on the contracts
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of the joint venture in the absence of a special contract
and thus avoid an absolute defense which the owner has against
the joint venture, the judgment should be reversed.

At a

minimum, the award of attorney's fees and interest should be
promptly vacated.
If, on the other hand, this court concludes that consolidation was prejudicial, or evidentiary rules abused, or
the trial was unfair or confused, the remedy would be a new
trial of the issues between the owners, contractor and surety,
with the prejudice, confusion and unfairness resulting from
consolidation removed.
The cumulative effect of the errors complained of
herein has been to deprive Plaintiffs of their proper day in
court and of a fair hearing, to facilitate an erroneous and
unjust verdict compounded by an unlawful addition of enormous
attorney's fees and interest.

Plaintiffs pray this Court to

rectify that injustice.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Lignell and Todd
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This Agreement executed the day and year first written above.

OWNER

CONTRACTOR

E. KEITH LIGNELL, MARIAN H. LIGNELL,
BURTON M. TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD

By

./

-~
_..-r-

-

/

CLIFFORD
dba BERG
FRANK C.
dba BERG

M. BERG & WILLIAM R. BERG1 BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COOX
BERG, an individual, A JOI!
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

•

/

/

/

'
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DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

II- ,;,{

This supp~_em~:-.ts that cerc:ain Contract dated
llovem!:;er 16, 1971 between ::. Keith Lignell, ~iarian H. Li~ell,
B1Jrton :1. Todd a.TJd E'hyllis W. Todd, the Owner, and Clifford !1.
Berg and William R. Berg, a partnershi?, dba Be~g Brothers
Construction, A Joint Venture, dba

Be~g_

Co:1struction Company,

the Cont:::'actor, at Incline Terrace Apat•tments, Salt Lake City, Utah.
In considerat.i.on of $40i,2ll8. 1JO, the Cor,tractor agrees
to perform all the worl-:
<'-'1

r~quircd by

additional t"went?-twO units

Terrace ApartTnents.

the Con·:ract Docwnentz for

CincL1din~

extras) at the Incline

This increases the contract sum from

$1,351,755.00 to $1,759,003.00.
The work to

~e

performed •.mder

thi~:>

Contract for t!le

entire project shall be completed by July 15, 1972.

C:xr.ibit
Witness

Oate
Reporter

~-I
-~U

·-L;~{; ;¢:
I? • _.& •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A-3

OF

MARYLAND

Performance Bond
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: C1it!'ord M. Berg and \Iilli., R.
Partnership, dba, Berg Brothers ?onstruction Company and Frank

NOW, THEREFORE. THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION is •uch tha~ i
be nuU iUid

~~= :t.JM~~UI~= said contract, then this obligation ohaU

The Surety hereby waives notice of any alteration or extension of time made by the Own~r.
Whenever Contractor shall be. and declared by Owner to be in default under the Contract, 6
having performed Owner's obligations thereunder, the Surety may promptly remedy the defaalt:
promptly
(1) Complete the Contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, or

(2) Obtain a bid or bids for completing the Contract in accordance with iu temuu
tions, and upon detennination by Surety of the lowest responsible bidder, or. if the r ·
upon determination by the Owner and Surety jointly of the lowest respons1ble 1
for a contract between such bidder and Owner, and make available as work
though there should be a default or a succession ol de£ault!J under the contract or
arranged under this paragraph) sufficient £unds to pay the coat o( completion
contract price: but not exceeding, including other costs and damages for which the
hereunder, the amount set forth in the first paragraph hereoL The term "balance o(
as uted in this paragraph. shaH mean the total amount payable by Owner to
Contract and any amendments thereto, leu the amount properly paid by Owner to
Any suit under this bond must be instituted before the expiration o{ two (2) yean
whicb final payment under the contract (ails due.
No right of action shall accrue on this bond to or for the use of any penon or corporatiod'C
the Owner aamed herein or the beinl, executors. ad.ministratora or succes10ra of Owner.

Signed and oealed th,u·'---~1,.,6'-'t,_h,__ _ _ _ day ol February
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
>

-6.-~-nv
.lfy

{ :3ERG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY---

.:r=-t- 19.z.l
,Zk.LfM=--.Yotary Publu;

/6 ;X

c.......,,,.. "P'"''

0

'/;_3

X

FIDELITY AND

2 Yr. ?rem. 19,136.00
1&161 J
.\oPI'O"'d bl' n .. AmomC'lln lrutount ol .\n:htu:cu. \./.A.

CJOGd-&OM..

..£ J~

day oi

!

P'J!to

p"7F'4 1hZ J~

DEPOSI~

COMPANY OF MAi{Y().I

BY----------------~~
::!:arl D. Brown

~nc

So. A..JII
Marth Funding
1969 Edtuon.for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OF

MARYLAND

BIA'-TI MOIItll:

Labor aod ~aterial Paymeot Hood
Note: Thll boml ~-'-ted simultaneously ritb Performaace Bond iA favar
ol theowaer CDDd&Uoaedoa the full and {ajthCW perfonnaac:e of the contract.

KNOW ALL ME!'/ BY THESE PRESENTS:Cl:i!!ord M. Berg and ''illiam R. Berg, a
That ~tnersllip, dba, aerg Brothere Coll8trnction Com]l8D1 and Frank c. i!erg, 8ll

,·I

IncfiVICiuar,-a-J'OI:irrv&n~.._. '-' tlMI ~~--·

~llll'al!Jo 4363 Camilli Pml!.,_~§lL~!LCiti. "f~"i!lfD.Z-' Cloa, cerg c;or.striiceion
u Principal, hereinaCter called Principal, and FmEUTY AND D1rOsrr CoMPANY or 1\olA.an..um a corpo tio
of the State of Maryland, with its home office in the City of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. A.,~ Surety,"tr:
inalter called Surety, are held and 6rmly bouod un~• Keith Lig11ell, f!arian ll. Lig11eU,
Burton M. Todd and Fhyllia ·.;. Todd, 223 South 7th l:aat, Salt Lake City, utaii84ioz

~f:;r""'ih:'~~~':i''cl:Jmants u hereinbelow deUed
in the amouot of One MillA.Q.!l..~ee !Inn~. Fifty-one Thousand Seven l!undred Fi!t;r-live
00
Dollan ($l,35l,755·
tr";"'th.";~:::t:h'::o~.:ci';u-.':i~ty bind themael-. their hein.
eucutora, administraton. succea>n and au&l!lll. JOmtly and severally, 6rmly by theoe presento.
WHEREAS, Principal baa by writteo agreemeot dated
tlovember 16,
19..11.,
entered into a contract with Owtau Cor~z,aing work re_~ed b::r Contract Documents for
Incline Terrace Apartments at 450 South Tenth l:aat, Salt
u Obligee, hereinafter called

in aa:ordance with drawings and opecificetions prepared by.~R=;onal;;'=';'d,_=L3'·;::"c;·o;:l;=•=n_ _ _ _ _ _ __
610 !:sst .South Tem'Ol.e, Salt Lake Cit,y'!:.'::U:;ta.h=,_8:.4.:.:l::0::2:....._ _ _ _ _ _ __
CH--..haD--.~..d--..w.-

which contract is by reference made a part hereof. and ;. hereinafter referred to u the Cootract.
NOW, THEREFORE. THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION io ouch that, if PriDcipal ohall
promptly make payment to all claimants ao hereinaftOI' defined, lor all labor and material uiiOII or ..-n.
ably required for u.e in the perfonnance of the Contract, then thio obligation ahall be void; otherwile it ahall
rmWn 10 full force and effect. subject. however, to the following conditiona:
1. A claimant La defined as one having a direct contract with the Principal or with a •ub-coatn.ctor of
the Principal lor labor, material, or both, used or reasonably required for 1110 in the performance of the
contract. labor and material being construed to include that part of water, gao, powOI', light, heat, oil,

paoline. telephone service or rental of equipment directly applicable to the Contract.
Z. The above named Princil:! and Surety hereby jointly and severally agree with the Owne!' that every

~ter'ili! :~::n:bi~~e"~t of ~,:~~·~n~~kb:obbo~.;:."~':~~..~~~~~~~~ ~.,Y!
furnished by such clai.ma.at, may sue on this bond for the uae of such claimant. protecUte the suit to 6Dal
judgment for l!IUcb sum or sums u may be justly due claimant, and have execution thereon.. The Owner abaU
not be liable for the payment o£ any oosts or expeDRS of any such suit.
3, No suit or action ohaiJ be commeoced hereunder by any claimant:
(a) Unl- claimant, other than one hevin~ a direct contract with the Principal, ohall he"" ~
written notice to any two of the following: The Principal, the Owner, or the Surety above named. 1nthin
ninety (90) days alter ouch claimant did or perfonned thelutol the work or labor, orlumiahed the Jut
of the materials for which oaid claim ;. made, otating with substantial accuracy the amouot claimed and
the name o£ the party to whom the materials were furnished, or for whom the work or labor wu done or
performed. Such notice ohaiJ be oerv<d by mailing the same by registered mail or certified mail, ~
prepaid, in aa eJlvelope addreooed to the Principal, Owner or Surety, at any pla<:e where an oflice ,.
regularly maintained for the transaction of buoineoo, or served in any maaner in which legal may be oened in the state in which the aforesaid project io located, ave that such oervice need not be

,':;'J,

I.
I·

i

.\rl';b:/.~ :.~tion

i
I

~n

(I)

mad(b'}"
of one
year foUowing the date on "hich PriDcipal ceuecl wor!<
aid
Contract, it being undentood, ho"""""· that if any timitatioa embodied in this bond io pn>hib1ted by
any law CODtrolliag the co..truction berea! ouch limitation ahall be deemed to be amended oo u to be
equal to the minimum period of limitatioo permitted by ouch law.
..
(c) Other than in a otate court of oompetent juriodiction \D "!'d for the c;ountyorother poli~ oubdivision of the state in which the project, or any part thereof, 1111tuated, or"' the Umted Stateo D Court for the district in which the project, or any part thereof, ~amtuated. and not e!oewhere. .... ~-.
4 The amouot of this bond shell be reduced by and to the extent of any payment or peymeatl """"' ll1
cooc1 Wth hereuoder, incluoive of the payment by Surety of mechania' tiens wbich may be filed of record
ageinot oaid improvement, whether or not claim for the amount of such lien be praeated under and_....
this bond.
F b
72
Signed and oeeled thio
16th
day of
•
A.D. 19-

ruar:r

Subocrib<d and swam to before me thi•

J--_,o7i
JL,

~

-75'.:.:, 192:.2
-Z:-:cifiy&'y, ,Notary Pub&

/;,:;

c--. ..,.,u,

{ 3 ERG CONSTRUCTION COMPA.'I!

0/ )..I 1,3

A"""tol

L

dayof

X

(SJW.)

tt?flin/?n ..C?,s-6. ~

1r

-fiiii' YLAND

FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MAR
-/
/
(S..U.)
By .
Tilll
Earl
D.
Brown
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L

'

j

'

1

2
STATE OF UTAH

3

4.

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
CLIFFORD M. BERG, being duly sworn upon his oath, do:

5
6

says that:

7

1.

8
9

He is a partner in Berg Brothers Construction Compt
Con~·

"IDember of that certain joint venture doing business as Berg

Company.

10
2.

He is authorized to execute documents on behaU o! Be:

ll

12
13

tion Company which are binding upon the said joint venture,
therein and all members thereof.

14
15
16

3.

The project known as the Incline Terrace Apartments.

and t:!:J.ere are to your affiant's knowledge no liens or claims whit:
result in liens on the said project, except:

17

Toy Hansen Plumbing
Bateman Electric
Western Sheet Metal
S & H Painting
Western Drywall & Claron Bailey
f. Western International Industries dbR
Lady Fair Kitchens, Time Commercial
Financing Corporation, Pioneer Wholesale
Supply Company. Intermountain Lumber Cooc
g. Standard Builders Supply
h. Dahn Brothers. Inc.
i. Elias Morris & Sons Go.
j. John H. Gerstner, Jr.
k. Superior Insulation
1. Olympus Glass Go.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

26
Dated this

27

J,q;.f

day of February, 1974.

tQinl !Jl }.j

28

CLIFF RD M. BERG

29
30

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

31
32

all~

/~day of Febr.:

I ~y Gommi•sion Expires:
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; DEFENDANTS

{

:

EXHIBIT

/{,~-o<.

l

SUBORDINATION OF LIEN RIGHT

1

2
Baaed 11pon the m11tual consideration exchanged· between the below

:s

mentioned parties, Clliford Berg and William Berg dba Berg Brothers

4

5 Conatruction, a partnership and Frank Berg, an individual, a J'oiDt Venture
6 dba Berg Construction Company hereby aubordiDate any and aU lima or claima
7

which may result in liena

a

OD

the below deacribed premioes to the righta, title

and interests of the Travelers Insurance Company, a CODDecticut corporation,

9
on the subject premise• arioing pursuant to that certain Deed of Trust datld

10

ll March 28, 1973, executed by E. Keith Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, hia wUe,

l2 and B11rton M. Todd and Phyllia W. Todd, hia wife, aa Truatora, in the aum of
1:S $1, 700. 000. 00, to Title IDaarance Agency of Utah, IDe., aa Truatee in favor of

14 the Travelera IDaurance Company, a Connecticut corporation, aa Beneficiary
15 and alao to the righta, title and inter uta of Ziona Firat National Bank on the
16

subject premiaea arising p11rauant to that certain Deed of Truot dated January

17

29, 1974, by E. Keith Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, hia wife, ud BurtDn M.

l6
Todd and Phyllis W. Todd, hia wife, aa Truatoro, in the aam of $Z67, 000. 00

19

to Ziona Firat National Bank, aa Truatee, and in favDr of Ziona Firot National

20

21 Bank, aa Baeficiary.
22

The premiaea to which the subordination agreement appliea are lmowa

23 aa the IDcliDe Terrace Apartmenta, more particularly described aa follclwa:

24

l.) Com 132ft S fr NW cor LotS, Bll< ZO, Plat F,
SLC Sur. S 37 ft E 82. S ft N 39"6' E 48. 18 ft N 30"
Z2'20" E 56.19 ft W 30U9 ft S 39"6' W tD point d11e
E £r beg W to beg. 2.) Com S rds S fr NW cor Lot
5, Bll< ZO, Plat F, SLC a11r. S 39.5 ft E 8Z.26 ft N
39"6' E to a point d11e E of beg W 110.97 ft to beg.
3,) Com Z-1/2 rd S of NW cor LDt S, Bll< ZO, Plat
F, SLC S11r. S Z-l/2 rd E S rd N Z-1/2 rd W 5 rd to

25
26
27

26

29
30

31
:S2

.

1

_&'bgu described on Exhibit "A" attac:bad lleNto.
Dated thia 1at day of February, 1974.
Cliliord Berg lc William Berg dba Berg
Brothers Construction, a partnership and
Frank Berg, an individual, a Joint Vencv.re
db& Berg Conatr11ction Company ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
By
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"ZA..~~ ~

Byo~.£~

t

XH I B I T

• A•

~

Bi:GINNING at a point 33 feet North of the Southwest corner of Lot 0 U
Plat ~F" Salt take City Surwy and running thence llorth 0°00'46" we;u
feet, thence llorth 89°57'5~" East 82.50 feet; thence South 0°00'o6" l'<lt
feet:, thence llorth 8g 0 S7' 5~" East 65.25 feet 1 thence llorth 0°00'o6" Welt
feet, thence llorth 89°57'54" East 242,25 feet, thence South O•OO'o6' t.~
feet, thence South 89°57' 54" West 36,0l feet, thence South 0°00 1 o6" U.t
feet, thence South 89°57 • 54" West 353.99 feet, to the point of be!linnir4,
TOGi:n!ER Win! a right-of-way over a l2 foot alley described as follows:
Cot::mancing 7 l/3 feet West of the Northeast cornar of Lot 4, Block 20 1
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence South l2 feet; thence taat
faet; to llth East Street; thence North l2 feat; thence West 337 l/3 f~
place of beginning.

l1

txCtl:'TING n!EREFROM:
BEGiliNING at a point 33 .feet llorth and l58 feet East from the Southwest
of !At ~. Block 20, Plat "F'', Salt Lake City Survey, running thenceliorl
feet, thence East 6 feet, thence South l2 feet, thence East l27 l/3 fo~
South l20 feat,. thence West l33 l/3 feat to the point of beginning,

~

A Leasehold Estate In:
Bi:GINNING at a point 33 feet North and l58 feet East from the Southwest
of Lot 4, Block 20, Plat "F'', Salt Lake City Survey, running thenceior.
feet, thence East 6 feat, thence South l2 feet, thence East l27 l/3 feot.
South 120 feat, thence West l33 l/3 feet to the point of beginning.
All as reflected in that certain lease agreement dated April lS, 1971,:
between Wayne N. Mason and Pearl B. Mason, his wife, Lessors, and&.~
Lignell and Marian H. Lignell, his wife; and Burton M. '!'odd and Phyllil
his wife, Lessees, and such lease being recorded as Entry No. 2o021!8,
Lease and Option to Purchase was recorded April lO, l973, as Entry No,
in ilook 3298, l)a~te 399, records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

. :'7

v'-1'4_

TOGEnlE:R Win!, and wi:thout limitation of any kind, all iq>rove1110nts ol
na=e construCted or locate4 on said describe4 property; aDI1 togethlr
&fter-ac,.uireci title to tbe land describe4 in Parcel B.

tiV 6:..
~17J;fr
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)!IX*' 'fi 'I4¥1JXCorroon and Blac.k
Name of Agent... ______________

I

APPLICATION FOR CONTRAcr OR BID BOND MADJ1 TO TBB

~

.

·---------~

.;'f

,-,

c

.:-

Fidelity and Deposit Company
01' MARYLAND

HOME OFFICE

IMLTIMOIIE, MD. >120J

4. Kinds and amounts of bonds required; Propooal Boad, • - - - - - - - 1 Coatnet Boad, t.J..35l, 755.
Labor aad Material Boad, .~51, 755~----: Maiatea....,. Boad, • - - - - - - -

5. To whom is bond to be given?.~~-~ith

.H&'!!!.!.J_, ___M.!_r__!!!!!_~ignell._~~

M. Todd and

cGi,.hall-•..wr-.u .. ~_.._.tilW

r

J

,

;;

i
j

j

i..
~

Addres&----------------~!_1_~~· W, Todd

6. If bond applied for is Proposal Bond, will it operate u a linal bond?

.State date bido to be opened

, 19_ _ Approximate amount of bid, 1 - - - - - - - - - -

-----------

What bids for other contracts have you o u t s t a n d i n g ? · - - - · - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

------------------------------

7. The amount of Contract is: , __1,.,1?1, 755 ~---·---------_J)•te awarded. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(U coauact price ill pn- vdt ol

~. ~~~ &.t.11f01aal*

toW ol W~Hnetl

8. Nature of Contract (Give concise description of proposed work and loc::aJ.ity) ...

-----------~~~ all_~~.!.lt__ :;:~red ~the Contract Do~~~=-~~------------·
____ _]:.!!_cline Ten.'!.!'_'!..!l!!.~~~~•--450 ~_l_Oth -~~st,_Y.~~:__.!:_~ City, __!1~9. Name and address of Architect or Engineer in charge....-~,__K<!!!'.!!_ _________________________ _

!

1

t

.!

!

\Vhat is his estimate of cost of work? S - - · - · - - - - - - Y o u r estimate?'---··--------10. Other Bidden on above contract including bigheot and lowat;
>IA>UI

I

ADDIUISS

BID

i

!~___________j___
r
-9
-

7

i

If more than five bids, tabulate them on separate paper and attach

to

above

TERMS OF CONTRACT
11. Date work is to be commenced.--.. --·-·--·--·

.Date work is to be comple•teO'--------

12. Penalty for non.-completion on time._, _____.. _·_ _ _ _.Premium for advance completioa....- - - - -

13- Is there a strike claUH: in the contract?..._____ _ . . A n arbitratioa provision?. ____ .. _ _ _ _ __
14. Payments, when to be made on c o n t r a c t ? . - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15. Amount of advance payment, if any S - - - - - -
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or corrections, when 10 m<lde, shall be prima fa.cit coi'Tttt; Fouus, ~at the Company i!l authorized and empowered, without notice to ar knowl·
~ge of _the undentgned, t? ~uent to any change "':'~ats?ever In satd bo.nd or bond• and/or any contracts referred to in said bond or bonds
and/or 1n the 1enerat cond1t1ons, plana and/or speotlcanons o1:ccompanyu:,:~g aa~d contracts and. to a.ue.nt to or ta.ke any aaaignment or a.saign.
menrs, t? execute or consent to the execut:~on of any conunuauons, extenstons or. renewal!! of satd bond or bonds and to execute any substitute

:;::f~t~t:d~~=r~~~t:~sa;.~ ot~h~i~~d~;~~~i~~;,~·.re~:~o~u~dd uo:J~~~:~~1th0ft~~A~~~~~re::~~~~~ra~a~ti1~~~ta=~~

by ~e Company does or mtght substanually tncrease the llabthty of the unders1gned; and the undersigned agree to waive, and do i-lereby waive,
nouce of any breach or breaches of any such bof!-d or bonds, or of any act or deiault that may give nse to claim hereunder; FtnH, to aslltn.
transfer and set OVe", and does or do hereby asstgn, tran,fer and set over to the Company, as collateral, to !lecu~ the obliptions herein and

!ff~f~:'a!"!e~h~d:: ~{~~~~~~~c tf ~~dub~~~1nt~~et ~f{t)anri'y =~:O~~n~e;~~~~~~:~u~:~~~~~~~i;~~~~~~~~~~~0y ~~h

0

of sa1d bond or bonc:fs. or any of lhe.JI?. or of any other bond or bon_ds executed or procured by the ~om1?'U-y on bdlali. of the undentgned: or
(2) ~! ~ny breach ol the agreements !n any of the paragrap~s herem con tamed; or (3) of a default m dtscharg'ing such other indebtedness or
ltabtht.tes when due; or (4) of any assJrnment by the understgned for the benefit of ~itors, or of the apP?intment, or of any application for

~~~~~"~C::;·;~ ~~~~:,~~~~P:~~·eP't:~~!l:c!~ ;=t~~li~d=t ~':i:O~e ro\f~_:fn~n~~.::;t;"~r(~)~f ~~"u"nd~~~~~~:i~e:,
r:t:~:gth~d:s~~!i~tl::i~~d~~~~~~~fe~o':.V::~ 1~~ in ~~~~n~~~o~h~~b~d~~~~t:n~nr~~~di~ ~il ~u::~h:q~:~~:~~
0
~;,; ~\"S:~=~~e;~~~ i:: :r ~:!tfeht~e:~==\:bi~~~b!i:
woct~':::~':i~~~:~~c!~~~!,~in1 ~u,!:

0

=

portation to said site; (b) All the rights of the undenigned in, and growinr in any manner out of, said contract, or any extensioru.. modiitca.tiona,
changes or alterations thereof, or additions tb!:r"eto, or in, or gTOWlng in any manner out o{, said bond or bonds, or any of them; (c) All actions,
causes of actions, claims and demand• whatsoever which the undl!nigned may have or acquW against any aubcontraetor, laborer or material
man, or any person furnishing or agreeing to fumiah or aupply labor, material, su~lies, machinery, tools or other equipment in connection with

~:t~~~~t :t! :!dti:~di~d~~d~!!:!~~::-'o~~~.o:.a=~~ereait! =~~~ d~:: s~~~ ~t~~~ili~~!:u~d~u:::n

e..tend to, and include, the fuJI amount of any and aU 5UlDa paid by the Company in settlement or compromise of any cLaima, demand.a, suiu
and judgmenu upon aid bond or honda, or any ot' them, on rood faith, under the belief that it was liable therefor, whethl!'!' liable or not, u
well as of any and all disbursements on aa:owlt of coats, ttpe:nM:B and attorneya' fees, u aforeaid, which may be made under the beliel that
auc:h were neceasary, whether nec:aaary or not: SEVENTH, that in ew:nt of payment, settJement or c:ompromiR, in iood faith, of liability, Ia.,

=:s~:C:a!rtb:ZC::.~t~:"~C:!en;:h;;~:n-: ~~en,:~~~:,~t~ ~~~u:a~~~,:j'!!o~
dence of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned., in an& elaim or IUit hereunder, and in a.ny and aU matten ari1tor between the

?r!C:Ui:~~~~~.~~:nciJ,~?;t;oc':!v:;.::.d4:t:- ~o!~tit::~~~~~~. ~~~Ux:f~~ ~~I.d:~~ho~':!~~ :dex=
:::ti~. f~ ~: =~t~rn;e'Co~:~ !:dbo~d ~:U=:l.;~Y~tht~~:UY0:ae:;~~;a~do~~~;~!~i!i ~~::.!~~

thereupon: TENTH, that separate suits may be brourht hereunder as causes of action acaue, and the bnnging of suit or the recovery of judgment
upon any ca.u&e of acticn shall not ~judice.or bar the bringi.ng of other auit:s upon o~er ca.11,ses of ac;io~ •. wbether. theretofo~ or the;reafter
arising; ELEVENTH, that nothing here1n contatned shall be con11der~ or construed to 'Willve, abndge, or d~1niah any. nght or remedy.wb:~ch the
Company might have if this inatrument were not e:x.ecuted; TWEI.FTB. that the Company 1hall have the nght to decline to execute sa.ad bond or

::~~ho; t~nJ~fi!~~·~~~tn~ ~~~~~er~~: ~t!~dr:r~~i=~na~n~:tT:~:i~~Ya~~a~=~:~.;';b:' !~~:'J:n~=~=

for which the bid or proposal bond ts giVen; TatRT!:,ENTB, ~hat t~1~ agreement shall be btndlnl{ upon the un~entgf!-ed and each of th~. whether
signiog as applicant for said bond or bonds or u tndemnltor, JOintlY and severally and upon the respecuve bell1, executon, admiaistratora,
successor~~ and aasigns of the undersigned, aJld shall be liberally eonsuued aa aplnst the undenitned.
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